Daily Report

Latin America

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Cuba

Bay of Pigs Commemorated With Meetings, Messages

AALAPSO Forum

FL1804233591 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1944 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] The 30th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs victory was marked with an open forum at the headquarters of the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Organization [AALAPSO] in Havana today. Numerous ambassadors from brotherly countries representing liberation movements and parties expressed their solidarity with the Cuban revolution and pointed out the importance of the Bay of Pigs victory for those who are still fighting for their freedom.

Santiago Guillermo, from the Dominican Republic, was among the speakers. He denounced the meeting held in his country last month by counterrevolutionaries of Cuban origin. The U.S.-sponsored group plans to organize new campaigns throughout the continent against the Cuban revolution.

Roberto Cana, member of the Democratic Political Commission of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front of El Salvador, also participated in the open forum held at the AALAPSO headquarters. Canas said that 1 January 1959 and the Bay of Pigs victory are two important incentives for those who fight for the liberation of their countries.

The ambassadors from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia and the representatives of the African National Congress, the People's Democratic Front of South Korea, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, also spoke. Guillermo Torrielo, international president of the Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Our America, and Rene Anillo, secretary general of AALAPSO, also participated in the forum.

Vietnamese Leader Lauds Victory

FL1804215591 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1933 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Text] Pham The Duyet, member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of Vietnam, has said in Hanoi that the victory at the Bay of Pigs showed Cuba's strength and its commitment to this day to defend its independence. During a ceremony held in the Cuban Embassy to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the defeat of the U.S.-led mercenary invasion, Duyet said that every Cuban triumph is a [words indistinct] (?symbol) for Vietnam.

Cuban Ambassador Armando Saucedo pointed out that the Bay of Pigs victory taught the world that a united country will never be defeated. On top of the Bay of Pigs defeat syndrome, the imperialists added the immense syndrome of the Vietnam defeat, said Saucedo during the ceremony.

Many important Vietnamese leaders and personalities were present, according to a PRENSA LATINA cable datelined in Hanoi.

Panamanian Communique

FL1904225591 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1943 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] The Panamanian Institute of Friendship with Cuba has issued a communique on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Bay of Pigs victory stating that Latin America should never forget that historic occasion. The text asks the U.S. Government to respect the Cuban nation which, it says, deserves support and admiration and survives in spite of the siege and attacks of the enemy.

The Panamanian Institute of Friendship with Cuba called upon the Panamanian citizens on this date to think of the accomplishments that a dignified nation can achieve when it is determined not to let any invading army subjugate them.

The document also recalls that on 20 December 1989 Washington tried its weapons in Panama, ravaged the lives of many people, and destroyed the historic neighborhood of El Chorrillo.

Joint Commission Session With Mozambique Begins

FL2304005091 Havana Tele Rebelde and Cuba Vision Networks in Spanish 0000 GMT 23 Apr 91

[Text] The ninth session of the Cuba-Mozambique Joint Intergovernmental Commission began today at the Sierra Maestra Hotel in Havana. The meeting will last until 26 April, when a protocol for the period from 1991 to 1993 will be signed. Ernesto Melendez Bachs, minister president of the State Committee for Economic Cooperation, stressed the importance of the mutually beneficial cooperation between Mozambique and Cuba during these difficult times for Third World nations.

At the opening session, Mozambican Health Minister Leonardo Simao, who heads his country's delegation, stated that the negotiations will contribute to even closer ties of friendship between the two nations. Mozambique and Cuba have had diplomatic relations since August 1976. Since that date, the friendship and assistance treaties have included the fields of education, medicine, fisheries, culture, and transportation.

ANPP Leader Attends Paris Drug Meeting

FL2204142091 Havana Tele Rebelde Network in Spanish 1100 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Text] Pedro Chavez, president [words indistinct] of the National Assembly of the People's Government, has said in Paris that drug traffic and drug addiction have a clearly economic origin and repressive actions are insufficient if not accompanied by improvements in socioeconomic levels.

Chavez participated in the anti-drug meeting, which gathered capital-city mayors from 50 countries in the French

capital from 18-19 of April. Chavez affirmed that the social and economic changes that have taken place in Cuba since the revolutionary triumph have permitted the root-level elimination of conditions that foster drug addiction.

Pedro Chavez pointed out that drugs are not a problem in Cuba.

Education Minister Attends Quito Meeting

FL2304010091 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 2302 GMT 22 Apr 91

[From the "Exclusive" program]

[Text] The need to strive to coordinate a regional policy to solve the serious educational problems in Latin America became clear today in Quito. The fourth meeting of Latin American education ministers opened today in the capital of Ecuador. In opening the meeting, Ecuadoran President Rodrigo Borja said that there is a qualitative and quantitative crisis in Latin American education, which is shown in the privileges enjoyed by a minority.

Cuban Education Minister Luis Gomez said to the press that only our country has met the goals set in the "Health for All" program. The Cuban minister added that our country is willing to share its experiences in order to contribute to coordinating a Latin American policy for education.

Haiti

Aristide Assassination Plot, Arrests Reported

FL2304001591 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1100 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Text] Former superior officer of the Haitian Armed Forces [FADH], Colonel Serge David, has been arrested and incarcerated. He was arrested last Friday and imprisoned at the Port-au-Prince National Penitentiary, according to LE NOUVELLISTE daily, which quoted statements by the government commissioner.

According to Commissioner Anthony Alouidor, the former colonel who was expelled from the Army in 1988, was involved in an international terrorism network responsible for a number of incendiary acts and provocations against industrialists and businessmen.

Another officer, according to LE NOUVELLISTE, former commander of the Infantry Unit at the General Headquarters (Presidential Guard), Colonel Christophe Dardompre, who was pensioned off 7 February by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, is under arrest for involvement in the failed coup-d'etat of the Tonton Macoutes, headed by Roger Lafontant.

The daily listed several other arrests made last Thursday in Arcahaie, 50 km from Port-au-Prince, for participation in a plot by former macoutes to assassinate President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in this locality next 10 May, on the occasion of Flag Day [commemorating the creation of the Haitian flag in Arcahaie on 18 May 1803].

Macoutes Arrested, Weapons Seized in Arcahaie

FL1904193591 Port-au-Prince Radio Antilles Internationales in French 1145 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Report by correspondent Fritzner Massillon in Arcahaie]

[Text] During raids in Arcahaie by Justice Minister Bayard Vincent and Captain Pierre Neptune, several persons involved in the bid for power on 7 January were put behind bars. Graffiti saying: "Down with Titide and up with Roger Lafontant's Seventh Fleet" can be seen on the walls. Uniforms of militiamen [macoutes], weapons, bullet-proof vests, and so on were discovered in the houses of several zealous partisans of Roger Lafontant.

[Begin Massillon recording] On Thursday, 18 April at around 1300, Justice Minister Bayard Vincent accompanied by Captain Neptune arrived in Arcahaie. Many people did not expect such a visit. During this visit, the justice minister effected an operation against macoutes. Jean Moliere, a well-known macoute was arrested. Notary Cressent Ambroise was also apprehended. The team found two guns and three passports under three different names: Escal Pierre Vanite, Pierre Jean-Jacques Cressent Ambroise, and Cressent Mathieu Ambroise. In the home of Bigore Beneche, the deputy judge at the Arcahaie Court of Peace, a 3-millimeter shotgun [as heard] was found. We remind our listeners that these three macoutes—that is to say Jean Moliere, Cressent Ambroise, and Bigore—are now in the Arcahaie jail.

Continuing the roundup, they went to the house of Marcel Moliere who many people know under the name of Dion, former macoute commander and former Arcahaie mayor. Here, they found a brand new macoute uniform well-packed in a bag. A search of the house of Pierre-Paul Sully, former VSN [National Security Volonteer, a corps of tontons macoutes] commander, former mayor, and prefect in Arcahaie under General Namphy uncovered a bullet-proof vest.

The houses of Gustave Garisme, Joseph Sully, and Petrus Bernadote were searched. Continuing the upheaval of the city, the team headed straight for the house of (Pierre) Merceron, former general under Papa Doc Duvalier and former interior minister under Baby Doc Duvalier. Here, they found his doors closed.

At approximately 1720, they went to Andre Cadet's house. Fortunately for him, he was not home yet. The team then went straight to Cabaret where they stopped at the houses of Yves Moliere and Charlemagne Bien-Aime, two famous macoutes in Archaie and Cabaret who were implicated in the Casale massacre [1969] and the Roger Lafontant coup.

We remind our listeners that we noted Captain Neptune as head of this operation, accompanied by a team from the Anti-Gang Service. We note also the presence of Emmanuel Raymond and Michel Campion, respectively first justice of peace and clerk at the Arcahaie Court of Peace. [end recording]

FNCD Warns Against Anti-Change Forces

FL2204202591 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1600 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] FNCD [National Front for Change and Democracy], the party in power, deplores the acts of violence recently perpetrated in the country, and attributes them to anti-change forces. This political crisis has two causes, according to FNCD. The first is the anti-change forces pretending to be partisans of President Aristide in order to mask their real plan: committing acts of violence to terrorize and agitate the people. This tactic is meant to lay the groundwork so power can later be forcefully usurped.

It is because Prime Minister Preval and the minister of commerce do not apply a realistic policy which could provide a solution to the high cost of living that the population is angry. It is because the Preval government does not reflect the same political trends as the FNCD Parliamentarians that there still appears to be a conflict between the Parliament and the Executive. Such a situation causes honest patriots to occasionally attack members of Parliament. Such a policy yields serious consequences: the enemies of democracy try to destroy the Parliament.

This policy must therefore be changed so that democracy can survive the difficult times that the country is facing. FNCD asks all militants and partisans to resist being influenced by chameleons who try to provoke them into violent demonstration. FNCD asks all partisans to remain vigilant so that Aristide can complete his five years of power as provided in the Constitution.

FNCD also asks the party's senators, deputies, and other allies within the Parliament to continue working fearlessly, as they are safe as long as they are defending the Constitution. Parliament must also keep the population informed about the laws being developed to protect the people's interests.

This is according to an FNCD press release relating to recent events in the country.

Violent Reactions to Market Fire Reported

FL1904204091 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 2000 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Text] Keen tension reigned at the end of the morning in the capital where several hundred young people forced the businessmen to close their stores. The demonstrators who were roving in groups with great mobility have broken the glass of several stores in downtown Port-au-Prince as well as the windshields of several vehicles. They accuse the Tonton Macoutes and the bourgeois of having started the fire at the popular Hyppolite Market which was completely destroyed last night. This fire allegedly had a criminal origin, according to the sellers who occupied the market.

The market was built at the end of the 19th century under the presidency of Florvil Hyppolite and was also called: Marche en Fer [Iron Market]. It was considered a unique historic monument of metallic architecture in Haiti.

Armed with stones and sticks, demonstrators took it out on the Americans who they accused of complicity in this fire. They chanted slogans demanding presidency for life for Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

The prime minister and the mayor of Port-au-Prince attribute what occurred today to: the anti-change forces, those who want to destabilize the government, and the reactionary extreme right.

Preval Asked To Resign

FL1904220091 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1600 GMT 18 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Max Bourjolly, second in command in the Unified Party of Haitian Communists [PUCH] accuses the Preval Government of conducting an insane policy and asks for his resignation.

[Begin unidentified reporter recording] PUCH deplores the fire at the Hyppolite Market and the acts of sabotage taken against citizens in the capital yesterday. Max Bourjolly thinks that the Rene Prevzl Government has lost the trust of the population in light of the negative results obtained so far. The head of PUCH, presently in Miami, contends that the Rene Preval Government conducted an insane policy and such a government must not use the burning of the Hyppolite market as a political argument. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Costa Rica

President Calderon Addresses Nation on Earthquake

PA2304032891 San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 0150 GMT 23 Apr 91

[Address to the nation by President Rafael Angel Calderon in San Jose—live]

[Text] Fellow countrymen: As was evident to all of us, today we suffered a strong earthquake measuring approximately seven on the Richter scale. It has caused various kinds of damage in our country. It was basically concentrated on the Atlantic coast region, specifically in the city of Limon and on Matina and Talamanca cantons, from where we have received reports about the most serious damage.

The first thing our government wants to do is to save human lives. That is the most important thing. The property damage can be replaced in the future with everyone's efforts, but human lives come first. The doctors at the Limon hospital immediately decided to evacuate the patients, because as long as we did not have a clear evaluation of the damage to the hospital structure, we could not risk having the patients there. Therefore, the first thing we did was to transfer the patients in the most serious condition, 28 of them, to the Mexico Hospital [in San Jose] Health Ministry and private individuals' planes, for which we are very grateful. The first patients have already arrived in San Jose where they will be duly treated at the Mexico Hospital.

For this task we immediately requested help, first of all, from Nicaragua, which has very good helicopters for the evacuation. President Violeta Chamorro and General Humberto Ortega, head of the Army, have both promised to send helicopters. I am very grateful to both of them for their support in guaranteeing the helicopters that will be in Costa Rica early tomorrow morning. They will be able not only to take those needing emergency evacuation from the center of Limon to other hospitals, but also to evacuate people who are trapped in certain areas, especially between Limon and Sixaloa and in the Matina area. The minister of the Presidency has already traveled to that region with a government team and tomorrow morning I will be flying to Limon with another group of government officials to personally (?inspect the region).

We have requested and received immediate cooperation from the U.S. Government, which is already sending a special plane with aid and cooperation. It will be landing at approximately 2200. We have also received an offer from the wife of U.S. Vice President Quayle. Gloria, my wife, spoke to her a few minutes ago, asking her for [words indistinct] to be installed in the Atlantic coast region.

I am sure the Costa Ricans will be willing to cooperate with our brothers in Limon. The Red Cross is accepting at its central offices in San Jose any aid or cooperation. [passage indistinct]

We had not anticipated a gasoline shortage, although we will have to stop the refinery production for some time. In addition, there are two friendly countries, Mexico and Venezuela; Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez will arrive in San Jose tomorrow [two-second break in transmission] Mexican President Carlos Salinas is also formalizing cooperation in supplying fuel. We can rest assured of that. As for the Costa Rican Electricity Institute, there are no serious energy supply problems. We will have electricity. There were doubts whether or not the Limon electrical plants would be operating tonight.

For the time being, we have the cooperation of Honduras, which is supplying the portion of energy normally supplied by the Limon electrical plant. For that reason, we do not anticipate an electricity shortage.

We are experiencing serious problems in the country. [words indistinct] We will make a complete assessment of the situation tomorrow. [Words indistinct] of the Housing Ministry will meet with me tomorrow so we can start at once outlining solutions to the problems and helping our brothers in (?Limon). The most serious situation has occurred in the province of Limon, an area traditionally neglected, the province that now needs the help of the Costa Rican people most. The government will make every possible effort to assist them in this situation.

Let us pray to God that the worst tremor has already passed. Let us pray to God that [words indistinct]. Let us pray to God to give us strength to overcome these problems. [passage indistinct]

Refinery Fire Under Control; Supply 'Guaranteed'

PA2304030191 San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 0202 GMT 23 Apr 91

[Communique issued by the Costa Rican oil refinery on 22 April]

[Text] The earthquake that occurred this afternoon in Costa Rica started a huge fire at the Moin refinery, precisely in the [words indistinct] area. The fire reached crude oil tank number 701, which has a capacity of approximately 100,000 barrels.

According to the reports provided by Oscar (Soto Blanco), manager of Recope [Costa Rican Oil Refinery] at Limon, the fire is under control at this moment.

The firemen that were sent to the refinery installations, together with the Industrial Security Team and Limon Red Cross officials, have launched a joint operation in control the fire and to take the appropriate measures to prevent the spread of the fire and greater consequences.

Only three persons are reported injured. They are members of the operations staff who were working with 40 persons at the time of the fire.

Dr. Carlos (Lastres), the manager of distribution and marketing of Recope, has announced that normal fuel supply is guaranteed at all distribution centers of the country. Therefore, all gasoline stations will be able to

operate normally. Recope urges the people to remain calm and not hinder the supply of fuel for the nation.

El Salvador

Mexico City Negotiators Said To Overcome Crisis

PA2204152491 Paris AFP in Spanish 0924 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Text] Mexico City, 22 Apr—The peace talks between the Salvadoran Government and guerrillas, which are underway in the Mexican capital, took on a new impetus this weekend after a "crisis" that lasted almost five days had threatened to bring the meeting to an end.

UN representative Alvaro de Soto said on Sunday that the negotiations are "destined for success, although I do not know when." He added that the meeting "might reach a decisive point in the next two or three days." The UN mediator hinted that the meeting, originally scheduled for 4-23 April, may conclude with agreements "that are realistic, but not as far-reaching as was initially hoped for." De Soto made his statements after the parties agreed to negotiate, in the next few hours, over a "reduced package" of "specific" constitutional amendments and "very concrete" political agreements, a high-ranking diplomatic source who is close to the talks told AFP. The same source indicated, however, that the issue of amending Article 248 (which establishes procedures for constitutional modifications), was left off the agenda, and the issue of the cease-fire was postponed for later.

Guerrilla Commander Joaquin Villalobos explained that the topics in the current "package" are the Armed Forces, the Supreme Court of Justice, the Central Elections Council, and the constitutionality of popular consultations. With these specific points, "we are going to test the government's commitment," Villalobos said. In reference to the issue of the Armed Forces, he noted that an effort will be made to "change the provisions that give them the attributes of a branch of government." As for the Supreme Court of Justice and the Central Elections Council, Villalobos said that an attempt will be made to give them "true independence," so that they "will not be manipulated by any party in government."

Villalobos, a commander of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), said: "If we cannot reach agreements regarding Article 248, we will work toward the adoption of a provisional article that would facilitate future negotiations on changes in the Constitution."

Prior to the beginning of these peace talks (the most protracted to ever take place between the guerrillas and the Salvadoran Government, and the ones in which the greatest number of delegates from both sides and from the United Nations have participated), the FMLN has said that the issue of amending Article 248 was one of the key points of the negotiations. Indeed, the talks began under strong pressure to expedite changes in the Constitution, because any amendment has to be approved by the current legislature.

The pressure stems from the fact that the current legislature will close on 30 April. Thus, if no agreement is reached before then, it would be necessary to wait at least three years before introducing amendments to the Constitution.

Miguel Saenz, a member of the FMLN, said that during the first nine days of the meeting, "there was some convergence on the three topics (Armed Forces, cease-fire and Constitutional amendments), but after the three-day recess, the "government delegation returned on Tuesday with a very negative position" that hindered negotiations. Saenz said that posture was the product of the "heavy pressure exerted by the Salvadoran extreme right through an intense campaign of threats, the likes of which we have not seen in many years."

The government delegation, which was always reluctant to talk to the press, on 20 April denied that the negotiations were in the critical phase and expressed confidence that some agreements would be reached.

On 20 and 21 April, a climate of frenzied negotiation was noted in the hotel, as an attempt was made to reach some agreements before Tuesday, the date originally established by both delegations as a deadline for the meeting, on ending the 11-year civil war which has resulted in over 70,000 deaths.

Both delegations said that the meeting might continue after 23 April. Saenz said that the FMLN is "willing to continue negotiating beyond that date if it will lead to an agreement." Government delegate David Escobar Galindo noted that "there is no time limit."

Merino: Reform Supported

PA2204175991 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSKL in Spanish 1200 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Text] Reports from San Salvador indicate that Vice President Francisco Merino has stated that the ruling Nationalist Republican Alliance, ARENA, will support Constitutional reforms before 30 April even if there is no agreement between the two negotiating parties. Representatives of friendly countries and U.S. congressmen arrived in the capital last week and have asked the combatants to reach a peace agreement as soon as possible. Alvaro De Soto, personal representative of UN Secretary General Javier de Cuellar, is participating as mediator in the talks between the guerrilla groups and the government.

FMLN Leader Explains Stand

PA2304044491 San Salvador Canal Doce Television in Spanish 0300 GMT 23 Apr 91

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[Text] Rebel Commander Guadalupe Martinez has confirmed in Mexico to this newscast that the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] has agreed to leave out of the discussions the topic of Constitutional Article 248. Guadalupe Martinez agreed with Vargas

[Colonel Mauricio Vargas, a member of the government delegation to the peace talks] that a cease-fire can still be attained prior to 30 May.

[Martinez] "(?It is not) exactly that we are giving up the possibility that Article 248 will to some degree be left open to discussions. That is not true."

Guadalupe Martinez said the FMLN has accepted the discussion of specific reforms in an effort to attain agreements in this round of negotiations because of the Salvadoran people's expectations about them. Nevertheless, the rebel leader said that this is the opportunity to delve deeper into the issues of reform of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Central Electoral Council, and the Armed Forces, and that a plebiscite be established in the Constitution. Martinez said that even if Article 248 is not amended, a transitory mechanism must be established so that other agreements on Constitutional reform can continue to be attained in the negotiations.

[Martinez] "We think that if this opportunity is not used so that the entire Armed Forces will truly be subordinate to civilian power, we will have obviously wasted the negotiation process in discussions that have not come close to solving the problems in El Salvador. Therefore, the issue of the Armed Forces necessarily has to be included in the issue of precise reforms to the Constitution. We must also include the issue of the electoral system. After the latest elections, there are enough elements to demand a reform of the electoral system. However, they must be in-depth reforms, not little reforms that will superficially change the electoral system when in practice it stays the same. The third topic we have identified as needing reform is the judicial system, especially with regard to the change in the current Supreme Court."

Coinciding with the view of the government delegation, Guadalupe Martinez said that a cease-fire agreement can still be reached by 30 May. Nevertheless, she stressed that this depends on whether the FMLN is permitted to conduct political activity when its arms are silenced. She said this is another of the points in which there is still no consensus.

[Martinez] "One of the basic FMLN demands is that when the war stops, the FMLN must begin acting politically in the interior of the country. That is so because for us, our main instrument of political activity at this time is our military structure. If the military structure is halted, if it is frozen, if the military structure is, let us say, at a recess, what are we going to do? Are we going to wait for the government to undertake, at its own initiative and will, all the political changes that the country needs? That would be absurd. What is the FMLN demanding? The moment that the war stops, we would become a political movement with the right to act in the interior of the country."

With this new turn in the negotiations in Mexico, Guadalupe Martinez said, the next few days will be decisive for peace in the country. She said it will depend on the agreement of deep reforms to the Constitution in the next 48 hours.

* Jorge Melendez on Conditions for Cease-Fire

91CA0108A San Salvador DIARIO LATINO in Spanish 4 Apr 91 p 5

[Interview with FMLN Commander Jorge Melendez (Jonas); place and date not given]

[Text]

Interview with Colonel Jorge Melendez, Third Military Region, National Army for Democracy

[DIARIO LATINO] New winds have been blowing within the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front], one of them having to do with the cease-fire. What conditions have prompted the FMLN to make this proposal?

[Melendez] There are more advantages now to new winds in the FMLN, with the prospect of the victory of an agenda into which we have put our efforts for the last 10 years. A negotiating process exists under the auspices of the United Nations and with the attention of world opinion. So, the cease-fire proposal is not new; in other words, the FMLN's proposal is for a political solution, a resolution of the conflict through negotiations.

The new conditions are that there is a serious forum for negotiating and that we have had the strength of Salvadoran society ever since people have realized the absence of democratic liberties, ever since there has been a public discussion of the existence of militarism, and ever since there has been recognition in the mass media and through various actions that the FMLN has political and military control of several areas. These conditions clash, however, with enormous psychological warfare by the government and the army, which want to portray the FMLN as opposed to peace and to a political settlement and as holding a radical and politically immature position. In putting forward its proposal, the FMLN is showing its lack of fear and its total determination to agree on a cease-fire under conditions that will guarantee social justice, the modernization and democratization of the Salvadoran political system, and an end to militarism and impunity.

The aim is for the world to know this and for the people to become familiar with it, to discuss it, to debate it; in other words, to publicize what is happening in the country. What does peace depend on? It does not depend on the FMLN disarming, and it does not depend on the FMLN changing from a radical, fanatical ideology. It depends instead on the country modernizing, on having social justice, judicial justice; above all, it depends on the first step being a recognition of what already exists in the country, two powers and a shift in the correlation of forces in the favor of the low-income sectors, the democratic sectors, and the sectors of the revolutionary left. In other words, what is needed is a new country, a country that acknowledges this new situation, which it must express through a more modern, more democratic political system and, moreover, through better conditions of social justice, through political conditions for the social struggle so that it does not take the path of arms. This means that the military

instruments should not exist to oppress the struggle of ideas, the grievance struggles, the social and political struggles in the country.

These, then, would be our conditions, the new winds. In other words, we have made great progress, and the conditions are present to achieve a political solution, but above all, the world and the country need to know exactly what is being discussed, and the conditions to achieve a cease-fire must be democratized.

[DIARIO LATINO] Colonel, how does what you describe as two powers manifest itself?

[Melendez] Well, there are two armies. There is a war situation in the country. There is control of territories, militarily speaking. Geographically speaking, there are territories in the hands of the FMLN. There is a lack of institutional government, which has been replaced by new forms of government, which although they are not called a government officially, are new forms of government, new forms of political expression and democracy, since in a great many territories neither ministries, nor mayor's offices, nor courts exist. So, the people have had to seek answers in the areas of health care, education, social assistance, and the administration of justice; they have had to seek guidelines, and the guidelines have been those of a people's, participatory democracy. In other words, where the decisions come from below and are made with input from the smallest village and where justice is administered with a view towards seeking the truth by inquiring and investigating so that trials can be conducted with integrity and justice can be done.

In other words, in all of these territories there is neither traditional justice, nor traditional schooling or health care; instead, there are other forms of self-government. In the military realm there is no permanent, institutional, fixed presence other than the military forces of the FMLN. Besides this, the guerrillas, the grassroots organization has a presence throughout the nation. In other words, this is a country in which there is war throughout. This is why we say that there are two powers. The FMLN is a military power, a social power, a political power, and a fundamental ideological power that is decisive in Salvadoran society. This is so real that the country's future is a battle between the FMLN and the current government, and revolving around this battle are all of the trade-union negotiations, including the oligarchical ones, and all of the country's political parties. This has been a fact for 10 years, and now in negotiating what we are saying is simply that the point is to acknowledge the situation that the country is in and to resolve these contradictions without arms, without the arms of the militarist army that exists, without the weight of the military on civilian society. The FMLN and the National Army for Democracy have armed themselves and exist to disarm the enemy army and to disarm themselves, to disappear along with militarism.

[DIARIO LATINO] You are saying that the two powers exist, that they are already part of the country's dynamics. When you make recognition of this two-power situation a requirement for a cease-fire, many interpret this as dividing the country in two. How do you see this two-power situation emerging from the negotiations?

[Melendez] Well, the country is at present divided geographically and politically. Rather than institutionalizing and legitimizing a country split in two, the point is to put together a country with a new correlation of forces.

[DIARIO LATINO] What can the civilian population expect from this cease-fire? For example, will there be no more checkpoints? How will the wage problems of the unions be resolved?

[Melendez] What the Salvadoran people can expect from a cease-fire is that we will guarantee that they will no longer have the oppression of the military on their backs. In other words, a cease-fire means that the military will go back to their barracks, not only that the shooting will stop, but also that civilian society will have a political space free from pressure. A cease-fire during which constitutional reforms are agreed on would also mean that the conditions would be created to guarantee the observance and monitoring of the human-rights accords that were signed in San Jose, Costa Rica. It would also mean that we would achieve political conditions so that the low-income sectors, the democratic sectors can organize and defend their own interests without fear of death squads, without fear of clandestine jails, without fear of killings and massacres. The people can expect as a guarantee that the army will continue to exist in its barracks, but also that the National Army for Democracy will continue to exist as a guarantee that the military will fulfill this commitment to a cease-fire and to respect political liberties and human rights.

So then, the point is not that the FMLN is going to guarantee grassroots grievances at the bargaining table. The point is that it is going to create the political conditions so that the people can pursue their struggles without fear of being killed or looking into the weapons of the National Army.

Guatemala

Government Announces Makeup of Peace Delegation

PA2204182791 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1524 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Text] Guatemala City, 22 Apr (ACAN-EFE)— The Guatemalan Government today announced the makeup of the official delegation that will meet with the guerrillas on 24 and 25 April in Mexico. The delegation will be headed by Government Minister Ricardo Mendez Ruiz and General Raul Bedoya Molina, chief of the General Staff of National Defense.

Vice President Adolfo Espina stated that they will be accompanied by Manuel Conde, the Presidency's general secretary, a deputy foreign minister, three generals, and two colonels "whose names will be kept secret." The talks will be held at a hotel located in Mexico's Federal District, in the presence of the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) and a representative of UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.

The CNR delegation will be made up of:

Bishops Rodolfo Quezada and Juan Gerardi;

Tere de Zarco and Mario Permouth on behalf of the government;

Amilcar Burgos on behalf of the political sector;

Alfonso Cabrera of the Christian Democracy, and Oliverio Garcia Rodas of National Centrist Union. Both are members of the opposition.

"The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) has not released the names of the guerrilla leaders who will participate in the negotiations," Espina noted.

On 16 April, the government accepted five URNG proposals for "institutional changes to democratize the country." At the same time, the rebel chiefs agreed to discuss President Jorge Serrano's peace proposal.

Nicaragua

King, Queen of Spain Arrive on First Visit

Chamorro Greets Monarchs

LD1904091691 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 0600 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Excerpt] [Announcer] In the early hours of this morning the king and queen of Spain, Don Juan Carlos and Dona Sofia, arrived in Nicaragua for their first visit to this Central American country. No sooner had Don Juan Carlos stepped onto Nicaraguan soil than he praised the country's efforts to re-launch its economy and broaden democracy. The following report is from our special correspondent, Javier Arenas:

[Arenas] It was exactly 1730 in the afternoon in Nicaragua, 0130 in the morning in Spain [2330 GMT]. At Cesar Augusto Sandino Airport, President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro waited at the foot of the steps to the Spanish Air Force aircraft—a more than warm welcome for the king and queen with a kiss on both cheeks, first for Don Juan Carlos and then for Dona Sofia, whom she took by the hand while taking the king's arm in order to walk along the runway. These were the first greetings:

[Begin Chamorro recording] We welcome the king and the queen of a Spain advanced in the joy of the difficult path of transition from a dictatorship to democracy. We welcome the king and the queen of a generous Spain, which has made us feel its fraternity by uniting expansiveness with opportunity. In the margins of our dramatic history we have written the words "Thank You Spain." [end recording]

[Arenas] The still-Sandinista Army pays honors to the king and queen at the beginning of their first visit. In the capital the Square of the Nonaligned is the venue chosen for the welcome by the mayor of Managua, who makes the most hardline speech about Nicaragua's recent past. Arnoldo Aleman and his view of the Sandinista decade:

[Begin Aleman recording] Regrettably, the history of our people has been truly punctuated with violence since its beginning, but never has Nicaragua experienced situations of terror and injustice like those of the decade which has just passed. [end recording]

[Arenas] A decade, nevertheless, from which they emerged with free elections that gave victory to the opposition to Sandinism, which is now in democratic opposition. Now, the king says, Spain has not and will not fail in its obligations to Nicaragua.

[Begin Juan Carlos recording] At the present time of particular difficulty for the reconstruction of the Nicaraguan economy, Spain will be equal to your legimitate expectations and will make a special financial effort to help this sister nation. [end recording]

[Arenas] The solidarity of the king and his firmness in expressing that solidarity, which he also calls for from the whole of the international community, are what received the most applause in one of the halls of the Ruben Dario Theater during a ceremony which enjoyed the color and music of Nicaraguan folklore put on in honor of the king and queen. [passage omitted]

Spanish Minister Assesses Visit

PA2204021191 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 2204 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] Managua, 20 Apr (ACAN-EFE)—Spain "feels optimistic about Nicaragua's future," Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez stated today upon conclusion of the Spanish monarchs' visit in the Central American country.

Shortly before the monarchs' departure for Spain, the Spanish foreign minister said to ACAN-EFE that the visit of King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia to Nicaragua represents "support for democracy, reconciliation, and economic recovery." "Spain will exert itself to the utmost to help Nicaragua, as the king has stated in his speeches," Fernandez-Ordonez added in evaluating the royal visit—the first that the Spanish monarchs have paid to the country.

The king's support for Violeta Chamorro's government became evident with the monarch's willingness to mediate before the international community on behalf of Nicaragua's reconstruction.

Fernandez-Ordonez said: "What worries us most is the economic reconstruction, the creation of work habits, the creation of a new developmental model, the encouragement of investments, and the existence of a social consensus without which an economic recovery is impossible." Since Chamorro's rise to power a year ago, labor unions linked with the Sandinist opposition have carried out strikes and actions against the new government's economic adjustment policy.

The Spanish foreign minister said that the upcoming Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) congress, scheduled for mid-July, "will be decisively important in efforts to achieve that consensus." According to analysts,

the FSLN currently consists of groups that advocate cooperating with Chamorro and others that advocate a policy of radical opposition.

Fernandez-Ordonez explained that Spain, Mexico, and Venezuela advocate granting aid to pay the country's $360-million debt to multilateral organizations, adding that the Spanish Government will cooperate by providing a $75 million stopgap loan to pay that overdue debt. The Spanish foreign minister also mentioned the possibility of other credits, over a 5-year term, and said that the issue will soon be discussed at a meeting of the donor countries' Consultative Group.

The Spanish monarchs, who today visited the historical city of Granada, approximately 45 km from Managua, and who had a private lunch with President Chamorro, will leave for Spain at 1700 (2300 GMT), with a stopover in Puerto Rico. During the stopover, scheduled to last approximately an hour, King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia will greet Puerto Rican Governor Rafael Hernandez Colon, to whom they will give a message of congratulations for the Puerto Rican people, who recently received the Prince of Asturias Award for their defense of the Spanish language.

Ortega Comments on King's, President's Visits

PA2204175691 Managua Sistema Nacional de Television Network in Spanish 0330 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Interview with former President Daniel Ortega by an unidentified reporter in Managua on 19 April—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] What is your opinion of President Chamorro's recent official visit to the United States, which ended today?

[Ortega] First of all, I believe that the government's message to the U.S. Congress failed to reflect the spirit of reconciliation that should exist among Nicaraguans. It was a revanchist and humiliating message, a message unworthy of the Nicaraguan people. Furthermore, some American congressmen made disrespectful remarks about the Nicaraguan Government's requests for help, to the effect that the United States is not a candy store. The fact is that the government went there to beg for alms and not to demand the cooperation that the United States owes the Nicaraguan people.

[Reporter] We are now facing another official event: the Spanish monarchs' arrival. You have met on two occasions with King Juan Carlos. How do you feel about his visit?

[Ortega] First of all, I believe that the Spanish monarchs' visit has been tarnished by the government's decision to repress the Olof Palme employees, who staged a peaceful demonstration. I have visited the Mexican president on several occasions, former president De la Madrid, as well as President Salinas de Gortari. Right there, 50 meters away from the presidential palace, I saw Mexican people staging demonstrations. They were given a free range; they were not repressed for protesting. Likewise, when I visited Italy in earlier this year to meet with Prime Minister Andreotti, there was a demonstration 30 meters away from the government palace, and no one repressed the demonstrators.

I believe that the Spanish monarchs' visit to Nicaragua should help to strengthen relations between the two countries. I cultivated those relations during my time in office; I maintained and developed them and, I am certain, they will be pursued and given greater impetus. Tomorrow when I speak with the Spanish king, I will discuss the importance of maintaining Spain's cooperation with the Nicaraguan people. [end recording]

Teachers Stage Nationwide Strike, Make Demands

PA2204222891 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1200 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] The school year for elementary and high schools may be suspended within the next few days due to the expansion of the teachers' folded arms strike seeking the enforcement of their collective contract and the regulation of the Teaching Career Law.

Today, 8,000 high school and technical teachers are on strike throughout the country, and according to Mario Quintana, secretary general of ANDEN [National Association of Nicaraguan Teachers], the strike will expand over the next few days.

[Begin Quintana recording] [Words indistinct] the Education Ministry's failure to enforce the Teaching Career Law, which should have been regulated. Our proposal contains four basic points: first, a new wage scale; second, job stability; third, retirement benefits; fourth, training and professionalization for teachers.

Second, complaints have been filed against the Education Ministry for its violation or failure to fulfill our collective contract.

Third, the teachers have demanded that the Education Ministry officially establish the salary that each teacher is to earn. Teachers are the only workers in this country who have not been officially notified how much each of them should earn.

Other complaints have also been filed regarding the AFA [Rice, Beans, and Sugar] packages. There are comrades in Rio San Juan whose AFA packages have been delayed for six months. The teachers have not received their teaching materials; in other words, tools, machetes, and so forth. Many of them must improvise lessons every day. We demand that the issuance of identification cards to teachers be accelerated so that they can identify themselves and use transportation tokens. Most of them are receiving the tokens but cannot use them because they do not have the cards.

As of today, 18 April, almost 8,000 comrades support these demands. The list is headed by Managua, with approximately 4,000 comrades; and followed by 1,400 in Leon; 1,211 in Carazo; 500 in Rivas; 250 in Jinotega; 110 in Masaya; 348 in Granada; 239 in Esteli; 31 in Matagalpa;

130 in Rio San Juan; and 63 at the Education Ministry's central headquarters, members of the Inatec [National Technological Institute].

Partial and total strikes are being promoted nationwide; the strike is widening because the Education Ministry has not provided a specific answer to the problem. [end recording]

Union Accuses Hurtado of Abusing Authority

PA2204222991 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1200 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] The protest by the Olof Palme Conventions Center employees is going strong. The striking employees again put up a tent in Bolivar Street as a sign of protest, because they want the the government to meet their wage demands. Earlier, the government tried to silence their protest and called in the riot police. The strikers returned to their old methods of struggle, but also decided to take several legal measures, outlined now by Arian Mesa Sosa, legal adviser to the National Union of Employees:

[Begin Mesa recording] We filed a writ at the Region 3 Appeals Court against Government Minister Carlos Hurtado, who is responsible for yesterday's events and decide [words indistinct] life and liberty of union leaders.

Secondly, we informed the Nicaraguan Human Rights Association, headed by [name indistinct], that we are going to charge formally that the workers' human rights have been violated [words indistinct] at the appropriate forums, such as the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, and the like.

We are also filing formal charges against the government at the International Labour Organization [ILO] Labor Union Committee—which is headed by Mr. Bernard [surname indistinct] and has its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland—because the ILO's labor conventions have been violated.

Finally, we are preparing to file formal charges against Government Minister Hurtado for the crime of abuse of authority, based on Article 369, paragraph 16, which states: An official abuses his authority when he in some manner, different from the terms contained in this chapter, violates any of the individual guarantees contained in the political constitution. We want to mention that Minister Hurtado's unlawful behavior makes him liable for the punishment contained in the above article, which states that an official may be suspended from his post for six to 12 months. [end recording]

Panama

Emergency Declared in Province Shaken by Quake

PA2304043091 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 0332 GMT 23 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Panama City, 22 Apr (ACAN-EFE)—President Guillermo Endara today declared a state of "emergency" in Bocas del Toro Province, which was shaken by an earthquake that registered 7.5 on the Richter scale. The epicenter of the earthquake was located in Costa Rica, a country to whic[illegible] he conveyed his "solidarity" because of the catastrophe.

Endara regretted that the earthquake had caused "fatalities, injuries, and economic losses to Bocas del Toro," located on the border with Costa Rica, but did not mention any figures. [passage omitted]

PDC's Arias Calderon on Break in Alliance

PA1904005491 Panama City EL DIARIO INDEPENDIENTE in Spanish 16 Apr 91 pp 12, 13

["Exclusive" interview with First Vice President Ricardo Arias Calderon, president of the Christian Democratic Party, PDC, by Reporter Luis Vejarano in Panama City; date not given]

[Text] [Vejarano] What will be Panama's future?

[Arias Calderon] It will depend on the presidential leadership, and to date that leadership has acted very unwisely, because President Endara's actions weaken the government's ability to attain the consolidation of democracy. To some extent, we Christian Democrats are going to have to take over, from the opposition, a large part of the leadership because of the president's deficiency. In addition, Endara's actions have left him with a truly minority government in the Legislative Assembly. It is a minority among public opinion and a minority among the country's democratic political forces.

I think such a minority government will find it very difficult to introduce the social and economic changes the country requires to solve the unemployment problem and to satisfy social needs. To the extent that the Constitution permits, we are going to have to assume much more responsibility than what is typical for those in the opposition. That is why I think nothing is going to mark the Endara presidency as much as the mistake he made on 8 April.

[Vejarano] What significance does the break of the ruling civic alliance have from the political, philosophical, and historical standpoint?

[Arias Calderon] It has a political-moral significance. It involves political ethics because President Endara betrayed the commitment we all made to the voters on 7 May 1989, when the people voted by an overwhelming majority to be governed by the ADOC [Civic Democratic Opposition Alliance]. The people also gave Christian Democrats an extraordinary vote of confidence, because we received more than 50 percent of the votes, and in the difficult situations during the partial elections of 27 January 1991, this action was repeated.

It has a significance with regard to the country's future because the Endara government is no longer an ADOC administration by having excluded Christian Democracy from the government and by rejecting the 28 votes of the PDC in the Assembly, through his unjustified and bitter criticism of our legislators.

The PDC members are the hope of a new democracy because we were the only force that was governing for the first time, and by excluding us, it is as if the government has turned toward the past, rejecting new styles and ideals in politics.

That has been President Endara's grave error and it is going to cost his government greatly and, unfortunately, also the country because it cannot continue to go from one political outburst to another and from agitation to further agitation. Therefore, the executive branch and the president are going to have to calm down.

[Vejarano] What are the PDC's immediate plans now that it is in the opposition?

[Arias Calderon] The plans are basically two-fold. With regard to the country, we will undertake and develop our new role as head of the Panamanian people's civic and democratic opposition to the Endara government. Regarding our party, we will carry out the internal electoral process that has already begun in the party to hold a congress, in which the party's highest authorities will be elected.

There will be months of intense activity with the Panamanian people, so as to encourage them. We will become the spokesman of the country's popular force, in its demand for a new democracy, with measures that respond to the social needs of the people.

[Vejarano] How can you oppose social laws in which the executive branch is interested and still maintain your party's principles in defense of the masses?

[Calderon] We do not plan to be in the opposition just for the sake of being in the opposition. We are going to evaluate each action and each bill presented by the government. We will make a critical and demanding evaluation. If under the pressure of our opposition, the government begins to undertake wise social initiatives, we will vote for them because they will benefit the Panamanian people.

[Vejarano] Do you expect your fellow party members to heed your call to resign from public posts? Does this call extend to minor posts?

[Arias Calderon] Rather than resigning, we senior officials who are PDC members have been excluded from the government in a very uncivilized way. We learned about it over television, the same method used to make changes during the times of the dictatorship. I would have preferred to receive a call from the president. Therefore, the resignations are just a formality.

All of the PDC members have accepted this decision with good spirits, and they leave their positions aware that they have done a good job and that they are now ready to carry out a civic opposition. The first signs of clear persecution because of political beliefs have been reported in the past 24 hours, and a high-ranking official of the current government said that those of the PDC had already eaten a piece of the pie and that now it was everyone else's turn.

Political fears exist among some people who are making absurd and false charges about coups d'etat, importing weapons, and phone tapping. These people have no legal authority to act like policemen or prosecutors without presenting serious proof. That is why I told the president that if he believes what he said [about the PDC], he should have ordered my arrest.

[Vejarano] Are the opposition strategies which will be used now the same ones that were used against the dictatorship?

[Arias Calderon] We will undertake our opposition through peaceful and civic means, respecting law and public order. During the dictatorship, we had to resort to the methods of civil disobedience and passive resistance. Our opposition is going to be firm and very serious, because we will defend the country's basic interests. It is also going to be a civic and peaceful opposition with full respect for the constitutional system, which we have struggled for and will defend at all costs.

[Vejarano] What is your opinion of President Endara's statements about the loss of confidence in a government ally due to the intelligence activities being carried out at houses in the reverted canal area?

[Arias Calderon] That has been what surprised and hurt me the most, because never, when we were speaking face to face, man to man, about this topic, did he express any distrust or concern. When I thought Endara voiced distrust, I would object and he would apologize and reiterate his confidence in me.

Endara's statements are justifications after the fact. They are an attempt to turn attention away from the real causes of the rupture of the alliance. Those causes are the desire for political positions by the Arnulfists, Authentic Liberals, and a profesional associate of the Panamanian president.

[Vejarano] How do you view your opposition to a government in which you are the vice president?

[Arias Calderon] There is no reason why the vice president should participate in any decision of the president, sign any document or attend any meeting, so that post, as it is defined in the constitution, is perfectly compatible with the reality of being the leader of civic and democratic opposition.

[Vejarano] How could the PDC satisfy the urgent needs of the poor, now that it is in the opposition?

[Arias Calderon] Basically through legislation and through the impact that our opposition will have on the government, because a government as weak as that of President Endara will have to pay attention to the public opposition, which is becoming increasingly more identified with the views of Christian Democracy.

When one belongs to an alliance one has to limit one's own proposals because of the need for consensus, and now, as the opposition, we will be able to act with much more freedom not only to continue building democracy but to continue affecting the work of the government.

[Vejarano] What points will guide the PDC's opposition stance?

[Arias Calderon] We will demand the following:

Budget

Each budget must entail a balance between attention to the financial debt and attention to the social debt. The social debt is a distressing reality the Panamanian people are suffering, but we must not commit the mistake of Peru's Alan Garcia and forget the financial debt, because that only leads to disaster.

Real Power

Under the dictatorship, the real power was held on A Avenue [Defense Forces Headquarters] and the formal power was in the Presidency. Comptroller General Carles seems to be repeating that formula, but placing the real power on Balboa Boulevard [where the comptrollership's offices are located].

Corruption

We will demand an end to and the punishment of any signs of nepotism, influence peddling, and corruption. When I was minister I pointed out that there was a relaxing of the ideals of public morality for which we had struggled. No member of my immediate family held a public post. The people do not understand how, after having accused the dictatorship of nepotism, that same situation now occurs in this government.

Social Security Fund

We are going to demand that all the information on the fund be released to the country, because only overall figures are now issued. When the necessary reforms are chosen, they should be implemented gradually and not drastically, without thinking about the living conditions of those covered by the fund. The relationship between the Social Security Fund and the Health Ministry must be equitable. It is impractical and illusory to believe that two systems can be created separately, costing more money to the fund and to the Health Ministry.

Privatization

We are going to demand that careful thought be given to the topic of privatization because there are some who talk about privatizing as if they had in mind the complete denationalization of our economy and permitting the excessive concentration of economic power and monopolies.

Privatizations are compatible with a social market economy and free competition, but there are some who speak of privatizations as if with a single stroke they are going to sell entire institutions to pay off the foreign debt, without worrying about the impact that this would have on the national character of basic decisions and about what we are going to do about monopolies embedded in an economy as small as ours.

Demilitarization

We are going to demand that the policy of demilitarization, depoliticization, and professionalization of the public security services be maintained. There is concern that all of the country's security services are currently under civilian institutions in the hands of a single party, because there is a threat of politicization.

Civil Service

We are going to demand that the professional quality and job security of government workers be guaranteed through a civil service law.

[Vejarano] Why hasn't there been a call from the PDC leadership for street protests against President Endara's actions?

[Arias Calderon] One does not promote public demonstrations just for the sake of demonstrating. They involve social dynamics that one must carefully weigh. It is possible that there will be protests in the future which we might sponsor but we will do so when they respond to vital needs of the people and not only to political problems.

[Vejarano] Can you delve deeper into your statement to the effect that President Endara has decided to govern with the PRD [Democratic Revolutionary Party]?

[Arias Calderon] All presidents need to have a legislative majority to obtain the approval of their main bills, and in the Legislative Assembly there are only two possible majorities. One is the biggest majority the government had for 15 months with the 28 PDC legislators, and the other is a more limited majority, which excludes the PDC legislators and seeks the support and backing of the 11 legislators who were former followers of dictator Noriega.

That limited majority already acted during the election of the current assembly leadership. Therefore, that majority, which runs counter to every principle of the civic movement, is not going to exist just for the sake of it, and the president will only obtain its support by exchanging favors with the PRD. This can only be obtained by paying a high price with regard to, among other things, the effectiveness of justice in Panama.

This is one of the most serious consequences because it not only politically compromises the president but also carries a high moral price which deeply affects his image in the country.

[Vejarano] If the Endara government does not resolve the social problems, would the PDC be willing to recover political power through other means?

[Arias Calderon] We will remain loyal to constitutional democracy, because we have not and will never betray it.

Commentators Discuss PRD-Government Pact

PA2204195491

[Editorial report] Panama City Radio KW Continente in Spanish at 1330 GMT on 19 April carries a regularly scheduled 60-minute "Voice of Reason" ["Voz de la

Razon] talk show hosted by former Panama City mayor Guillermo Cochez. Today's guest, Edwin Cabrera, is the former chief of the Government and Justice Ministry's Media Directorate.

Cochez and Cabrera begin be discussing various newspaper articles concerning the possibility of an alliance between the Democratic Revolutionary Party [PRD]—which supported the previous military regime—and the government.

Cochez notes that "various channels" have informed him that a Panama City daily EL DIARIO INDEPENDIENTE, whose owners include lawyer Hernan Delgado [a close ally of President Guillermo Endara], is holding negotiations with a PRD group that wants to buy the majority of EL DIARIO INDEPENDIENTE stock. Cochez adds he finds it suspicious that a newspaper partially controlled by Endara's "partner or a former partner is making it easy for the PRD to buy a press organ."

Cochez goes on to mention the existence of a certain document circulating in the National Legislative Assembly. Citing selected passages from the document, he notes that "in exchange for their support in the National Legislative Assembly," PRD deputies will be named as committee chairmen and receive ambassadorial appointments to countries such as Cuba. Moreover, former officials are to recover bank accounts and properties which had been seized by the government. Cochez also notes that "several newspapers have been bringing up the possibility that [Noriega supporter] Rigoberto Paredes may be released."

Cabrera reads portions of the document stating that the PRD and the government "have achieved points of concurrence." He claims that PRD representatives Ernesto Perez Balladares, PRD secretary general, and Mario Rognoni and government representatives Hernan Delgado, Menalco Solis, Antonio Domingo, and Ruben Carles have held several meetings to discuss the agreement. According to the document, the government has agreed to grant safe-conducts to civilians and former officials who have taken asylum in embassies, "providing that their status is not one of common criminals but of politically persecuted persons." The government will gradually release former government officials currently in jail.

Cabrera claims that the government will suspend the dismissal of public officials from the previous administration, and that the Comptroller General's Office will issue "favorable" financial reports on public institutions that were managed by former government officials. The PRD, in turn, will no longer issue "charges of money laundering against Endara, based on the affidavit by DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration] agent Yvette Torres, and will not submit a report on charges accusing Endara of harming the country's international prestige." He also says the PRD will support candidates of the Arnulfist Party, Molirena [Nationalist Liberal Republican Movement], and the Authentic Liberal Party for the post of committee chairmen.

The document cited by Cabrera, also states that the PRD agreed to support the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, and other "bills that enable the government to develop its programs." Cabrera expresses hope that the measures outlined in the document are "mere speculation."

PRD Deputy Predicts Streets Demonstrations

PA2204183791 Panama City EL DIARIO INDEPENDIENTE in Spanish 22 Apr 91 p 23

[Article by Lionel Blaisdell]

[Text] Deputy Alberto Aleman Boyd, member of the opposition Democratic Revolutionary Party [PRD], has told EL DIARIO INDEPENDIENTE that he cannot rule out the possibility of joint street demonstrations by the PRD and the PDC [Christian Democratic Party], as well as with other sectors such as the National Civic Crusade, to demand civic rights and positive solutions from the government.

Aleman Body added that President Endara's government is ignoring the fact that "the community's patience is running out," and that demonstrations could get out of control.

The politician also said that the recent dismissals prompted by PDC's ouster from the cabinet—not only of PDC members but also of civic crusaders—have compounded the widespread anxiety among the community. Currently these gentlemen are unemployed and they will look for ways to annoy the government, Aleman Boyd claimed.

During the week of 14 April, Aleman Boyd presented two draft bills at the Legislative Assembly calling for the reinstatement of dismissed government employees. Aleman Boyd claims that the current government's decisions on personnel issues "violate" the legal regulation because they are based on "political motivations" which he considers baseless.

One of the draft bills calls for the reinstatement of dismissed employees and the payment of back wages, on the basis that the firings "are illegal." The draft bill also points out that "no government employee can be dismissed until accrued vacation time is paid up."

PCC Chief Notes Need for Office To Run Canal

PA2304043991 Panama City LA PRENSA in Spanish 20 Apr 91 p 1A

[Report by Elkilia Santos]

[Text] Panama Canal Administrator Gilberto Guardia Fabrega has reiterated that when the waterway is handed over to Panamanian hands, it will become necessary to organize a new national entity to replace the Panama Canal Commission [PCC].

According to Guardia Fabrega, that entity, which could be a state enterprise, a joint venture, or any other kind of organization, should be in charge of managing and operating the Canal.

The official made those remarks during the 25th Annual Conference of Business Executives (CADE 91). He said that entity would need true autonomy and be effectively isolated from the ebbs and flows and instability of partisan

politics. According to Guardia Fabrega's initiative, the new entity will inherit in 2000 the same personnel working for the PCC at the time of the transfer, which is why it is important to start defining labor laws that protect the workers' benefits and encourage them to work.

He said that so far the "success of the Canal depends and will continue to depend on a number of integrated organizations and operational systems and procedures, which include a well developed structural and administrative chart."

He noted that from the Panamanian standpoint, the Canal is generating true profits, since it gives the country $70 million a year in tolls.

Guardia Fabrega added that the 1990's represent the final phase of the transferring of the Canal to Panama. He went on to say the he trusts that Panama will make the necessary planning to maintain the trust of the international maritime community.

In addition, PCC Personnel Chief George Mercier warned that a strike by PCC workers can "scare for good" the thousands of users from many countries.

In the face of this possibility, Mercier recommended a union be created for 2000 that would not follow the lines established in the Labor Code because "we would be putting a noose around our neck." He explained that this union would have a special bearing, like the one that exists today, which is based on the principle that "striking is not allowed."

Argentina

Government Denies Media Charge Against Menem

PY2204175291 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1455 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Text] Buenos Aires, 22 Apr (NA)—The Argentine Government denied today that President Carlos Menem had proposed Mario Anello—who is wanted by the Argentine courts on charges of laundering drug money—as an Argentine official at the 1992 exposition to be held in Spain.

In a communique released today at the Government House press room, presidential spokesman Humberto Toledo denied the report, and he stated that the Argentine Government will continue to take "every measure designed to further the fight against drugs and the drug trade."

Today Buenos Aires metropolitan newspapers quoted a report carried by the Madrid morning newspaper EL PAIS, which claims that "a report of the Spanish Attorney General's Office states that Argentine President Carlos Menem proposed Mario Anello, one of the individuals who is presumed to be responsible for the Argentine drug ring under investigation by Spanish judge Baltazar Garzon, as an Argentine official at the Expo-92."

In its first paragraph, the communique states: "Foreign Minister Guido Di Tella; Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo; and Fernando Taboada, Argentine charge d'affaires in Spain, have contacted Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Ordonez and Spanish Attorney General Leopoldo Torres, who categorically denied the report, particularly its reference to Mario Anello—who is wanted by the Argentine courts—being proposed for public office by the Argentine executive branch."

In its second paragragh, the communique says that "both Foreign Minister Ordonez and Attorney General Torres have authorized the Argentine officials to publicly disseminate this denial."

Menem Rebuts Charges

PY2204174891 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1306 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Text] Buenos Aires, 22 Apr (NA)—President Carlos Menem today stressed that he does not know alleged drug trafficker Mario Anello and that he has never met him. He added that the charge that was leveled in this connection is part of "an outrageous campaign against the Argentine Government," and that "what is most surprising to me is that this should have come from a major Spanish state agency."

Menem said that today he will contact with Spanish chief of state Felipe Gonzalez to clarify a situation that was caused by a document from the Spanish attorney general's office. The document was published yesterday by the Madrid newspaper "EL PAIS." The document claims that Menem proposed Mario Anello as Argentine supervisor for the Expo-92.

The report said that Anello "owns several enterprises in Spain for laundering money," and that "he is a close friend to President Menem, whose house he used to visit to play cards or billiards with his son [not further identified]."

Menem said he does not know "the reasons that they may have, but I do not know him." He did not rule out, however, that "there could be a photograph because I do not know how many people I see every day. This is normal for a chief of state."

In statements to Radio America, the president said that former secretary of culture (Julio Barbaro) "asked me to remove (Jose Lata Liste)" from the same position because of a similar charge, "but he did not tell me who the replacement would be. Such decisions are not made by the president."

Concerning recent statements by former president Raul Alfonsin, who blamed corruption on the government, Menem said that Alfonsin "is quite wrong, and he should prove his charge." Menem said that "the irregularities that are now being investigated in the customs office and in the mortgage bank began during his administration."

"Corruption began very long ago. Not even the church, which has engaged in a sort of self-criticism, has excluded itself. The church said that corruption has spread, and made reference to slander and defamation," he said.

He added that "the entire document [not further identified] is very good. I would like to highlight that it has praised the efforts that the state and other organizations have made in the struggle against corruption."

Concering his relatives, Menem said that "when mistakes are made, no surnames, influence, or friendship ties matter. We can see what is happening in Argentina."

Menem added: "I am submissive only to God—not to the United States—but I cooperate with countries, with the United States, and with the world by sending ships to the Persian Gulf."

He reiterated that "the Condor project has been totally deactivated. Only the motors now remain to be seized, and we are working on this task."

On the other hand, he said that the appointment of Rodolfo Echegoyen "was made after his name was picked from a list of three and after consultation with Brigadier Andres Antonietti, who assured that he has irreproachable honesty" and said that he does not know the reason for his suicide.

Concerning the accusation that former deputy governor Ramon Saadi made against him and and against other government officials, Menem said that they were "caused by resentment," and that "legal action will be taken" because "they surpassed the limit of prudence."

"Defamation has become very fashionable, and it should be strongly fought in order to do away with the irresponsible statements," Menem said.

He ruled out the possibility that Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo has postponed his trip to Europe to impose

several conditions on him, "because no one can impose conditions on the president." He explained that the reason for the postponement was "to talk about a propaganda campaign sponsored by the government to consolidate the new rules of the game that have been in force for the last two months in Argentina."

President Menem Signs Decree on Antidrug Program

PY2004204091 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1140 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] Buenos Aires, 20 Apr (NA)—President Carlos Menem and Interior Minister Julio Mera Figueroa have already signed a decree authorizing the immediate implementation of a strict plan to fight drug trafficking with the cooperation of the United States.

A government source has stated that "all security forces and National Intelligence Center personnel will participate" in that plan.

According to the source, the plan will not mean greater expenditures for the state because it will receive economic support from the United States, which supports the Argentine decision to fight drug trafficking activities "to the ultimate consequences."

On 17 April President Menem announced strict control measures throughout the country—by making aerial photographic surveys—to uncover the possible existence of clandestine landing strips used by drug traffickers.

Gonzalez, Air Force Chief Deny Confrontation

PY2004190491 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish 2038 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] Defense Minister Antonio Erman Gonzalez and Air Force Commander Brigadier Jose Julia today dismissed "any type of confrontation or tension" between the Air Force commander and Military Household Chief Andres Antonietti.

Minister Gonzalez also denied that the United States pressured the country into deactivating the Condor-2 project, saying: "No country can accept pressure by another country because its sovereignty and decisions must be respected."

Regarding the alleged confrontation between Julia and Antonietti, Gonzalez said: "Everything has been clarified by the president. There is nothing creating friction. There are no reasons for concern about the Air Force."

Regarding the Condor-2 issue—a project that was deactivated by the government—Gonzalez said that "it was an irritating point" in U.S.-Argentine relations because "the development of unconventional arms or technologies are always a risk for peace in the region."

"We are seeking elements—here we agree with the United States—that will allow us to develop technologies for peace and for the improvement of the standard of living for all human beings. We should eliminate hazards for peace in the world and eliminate weapons that go beyond a reasonable limit from national defense programs," Gonzalez said.

Gonzalez said: "No country can accept pressure by another country because its sovereignty and decisions must be respected. We are seeking agreements so all countries can pursue the same objective of guaranteeing peace in the region."

Julia denied any confrontation with Antonietti, saying that relations are "appropriate for those between a brigadier general and a brigadier major."

Julia expressed concern about what he characterized as "an attack against the institution," stressing that the Air Force "in no way" objects to President Carlos Menem's request for an investigation into presumed illegal activities since 1988 at the Customs House.

Julia said: "Some sources have involved the Air Force in contraband at Ezeiza Airport. It is said that we oppose investigations of drug traffickers and that we put obstacles in the path of Argentine-U.S relations. The institution thinks all these things are inadmissible," Julia stressed.

Julia denied that the Air Force is opposed to joining any other similar institution in a program to locate cocaine or drug plantations. "That is another fable," Julia said, recalling that the Air Force joined the United States in a similar operation last year.

"Not only do we not oppose it, but yesterday I sent a note to the defense minister asking that the investigation be extended to all firms in which the Air Force participates," Julia said.

Julia concluded by saying that the Air Force "has aerial photography means, the best laboratories in South America, and [words indistinct] to do the job with or without the United States," but I think "we will be much more effective if we work together."

Bolivia

Paz Refutes Traffickers' Disinformation on Army

PY2204180091 La Paz EL DIARIO in Spanish 14 Apr 91 p 5

[By Facundo Hurtado Castellon]

[Excerpts] Tarija, 13 Apr—President Jaime Paz Zamora has charged that drug traffickers have caused confusion among the public on the true objective of the Army participation in the antidrug fight.

The president said that "opposition groups" have questioned the participation of the Armed Forces in the antidrug fight and have thus disseminated distorted views on the situation in the country.

"The Bolivian people agree with the participation of the Army," he said, adding that the campaign set in motion by

drug traffickers has created an atmosphere of opposition to the military participation in the interdiction work. [passage omitted]

Paz said that the coca producers of Chapare and Yungas don't have to worry about the government's objectives. However, he emphatically said that the government will be inflexible with drug traffickers.

He recalled that the "coca for development" thesis remains fully valid and that the Army's participation in the antidrug fight will not invalidate it. He said that the government will sign an agreement with the United States next week, and that under the terms of the agreement, the U.S. Government will provide $66 million for alternative development programs. He added that the EEC will support the programs designed by the National Council for the Struggle Against the Improper Drug Use [Consejo Nacional de Lucha contra el Uso Indebido de Drogas]. [passage omitted]

Armed Forces Chief Recognizes Need for Advisers

PY2204184291 La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish 10 Apr 91 p 8

[Excerpt] Jorge Moreira, Armed Forces commander in chief, asserted yesterday that the U.S. advisers who will come to Bolivia to train Army personnel in the antidrug struggle will leave the country at the end of a 10-week stay as ruled by Congress.

Moreira affirmed that the armed institution is technically capable of carrying out tasks of any type but in the fight against drug traffickers it was necessary to request the assistance of U.S. advisers due to the characteristics of the problem.

Moreira made it clear that nothing can yet be said about the formation of a joint command to take charge of the antidrug struggle in the country, although a "command of special operations," in which U.S. officers will not participate, should be formed at the appropriate time. [passage omitted]

U.S. Charges of Police Corruption Evaluated

PY2004193891 La Paz Radio Fides Network in Spanish 1100 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Recorded passages in quotation marks]

[Excerpt] Fernando Iriarte, chairman of the Constitution, Justice, and Judicial Police Committee, has reported that the U.S. Embassy will give the Bolivian Foreign Ministry a report on the existence of a list with the names of 40 corrupt officers who have been protecting drug traffickers.

[Iriarte] "I am sending the Foreign Ministry a note requesting [words indistinct] me the report with the irregularities that the U.S. Embassy has observed. This afternoon, this document will be sent to the Foreign Ministry to [words indistinct].

[Unidentified reporter] "You are referring to the list of 40 names?

[Iriarte] "Not just the 40 names, but of all officers that have been observed and found guilty of faulty professional behavior. It does not matter if the number is 20, 10, 15, or over 40."

The Chamber of Deputies Drug Trafficking Control Committee has pointed out that if the government wants to protect the reputation of the police, about 90 percent of the police officers will have to be dismissed. Deputy Wilson Lora said: "The officers will be replaced. The interior minister has reported that he has already given the necessary instructions in this regard. The necessary steps to replace about 90 percent of the personnel began to implemented today. Most of the policemen will be replaced. Those who are not found at fault and who have not committed a crime or become involved in any irregular situation will probably have to occupy command positions. Those found guilty will have to leave their positions and be replaced."

General Elias Gutierrez, commander of the Special Antinarcotics Force, said that not only must the wealth of policemen be investigated, but also that of all who have become millionaires overnight. Gen. Gutierrez said this investigation should be undertaken by the National Police.

[Gutierrez] "All the commands have been making the first changes, particularly in the most productive coca growing zones because the largest number of crimes are committed in such zones as Cochabamba, Chapare, and Santa Cruz.

[Unidentified reporter] "[Question indistinct]

[Gutierrez] "Currently, several have already been carried out.

[Reporter] "[Words indistinct] against corruption in the National Police, interviewed people [words indistinct]

[Gutierrez] "I think it will be positive for all. Not only the policemen but all nouveau riche must be investigated. I believe it will be positive."

The government urged peasants to prevent the roads blockages scheduled for 13 May. The call was made today by Government Under Secretary Mario Antonio Oviedo on behalf of the government. [passage omitted]

Chile

Annual Chief of Staff Meeting With Argentina Set

PY2004200291 Santiago Radio Nacional de Chile Network in Spanish 1700 GMT 20 Apr 91

[Text] The chiefs of the Argentine and Chilean Armed Forces General Staffs will meet annually to analyze matters affecting their institutions. This announcement was made by Defense Minister Patricio Rojas after several hours of negotiations with his Argentine counterpart Erman Gonzalez, who arrived in the country yesterday and returned home last night.

Rojas recalled that 13 years ago the two countries almost went to war over a border dispute involving some remote islands, a war averted only through the timely intervention of Pope John Paul II.

Defense Minister Rojas said that the prevailing mood today is to maintain the best possible level of understanding between the Armed Forces of the two countries.

FPMR Reaffirms Decision To Join Politics

PY2204212791 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1704 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Text] Santiago, 22 Apr (EFE)—Alfredo Malbrich, spokesman of the board of the ultraleft Chilean "Manuel Rodriguez" Patriotic Front [FPMR], today reaffirmed his group's decision to return to the legal system, and denied that they are keeping their weapons.

In remarks to the newspaper EL SIGLO, Malbrich repeated that the FPMR has decided to "resolutely join the process of democratic transition in the political field," adding that since 11 March 1990, when the democratic government assumed power, it has not engaged in any armed activity.

Malbrich, who represents the FPMR's "historical" or "political" faction, was asked what have they done with the weapons they used during the struggle against the past military regime. He answered that no FPMR militant "is armed." "Under the current situation there is no need to promote the struggle for democracy through the use of weapons," the FPMR leader said in an interview.

The FPMR was created in December 1983 and split in 1987 when the so-called "Autonomous Front" was created. This faction is still calling for military struggle because it claims that the government of Patricio Aylwin and that of General Augusto Pinochet "are the same thing."

Last 15 April, the historical group announced its decision to join the political struggle.

Malbrich made it clear this time, however, that the reinstatement will be accepted if all civilian and military trials against those who fought "against the dictatorship" are suspended, and that all political prisoners are released. Malbrich said: "They are essential points for us, and no intelligent person could ask us to join the process from jail." He also ruled out any past or present connection with the Communist Party.

Armed Leftist Youth Rob Santiago Supermarket

PY2204130691 Santiago Radio Nacional de Chile Network in Spanish 0000 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Text] Last night at 2030 some 20 youths armed with pistols and submachine guns burst into a supermarket at San Jose de la Estrella and Santa Raquel Streets near bus stop No. 23 on Vicuna Mackenna Avenue.

The criminals broke display glass and forced customers to lay down on the floor. They stole 100,000 pesos and merchandise worth some 1 million pesos. Before escaping they scattered tire-puncturing devices and left leaftles signed by the MAPU [United Popular Action Movement], the youth movement, and the Lautaro rebel and popular forces, on nearby streets.

For fear of retaliation, employees and neighbors of the supermarket refused to comment on the attack. However, they did say that they are living in a very dangerous area.

MIR Demands End To Political Discrimination

PY2004003191 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1700 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Text] The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, MIR, has asserted that the government should give clear signs of its willingness to socially and politically involve all Chileans in the democratic transition process. The MIR political committee, headed by Patricio Rivas, has stated that social and political discrimination must be overcome.

The MIR added that the creation of a police body to combat violence and terrorism will help, but that this by no means represent a definite solution. Patricio Rivas said that the MIR will always reject police intervention in attempts to solve social or political conflicts.

[Begin Rivas recording] The MIR strongly advocates the search for a social and political understanding that to contribute to the safety of the citizenry, provide a new driving force to the transition process, and involve the Chilean citizenry as a whole.

We suggest that within the next few days the government, Congress, the political parties and organizations, and the church, should seek a pact for democracy and for the safety of the citizenry. [end recording]

Patricio Rivas added that the MIR believes it essential that the police forces as a whole should be subordinated to the Interior Ministry, that organizations for the defense of human rights should be created, and that those mentioned in the Rettig report be banned from carrying out intelligence work.

When asked about the charges filed against the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, Rivas said that they will probably have no effect if nothing is done about the causes of these charges. He emphasized that in order to solve this problem these groups should be allowed to become integrated and given a chance to participate.

Former CNI Director Salas Wenzel Released

PY2304124091 Santiago Radio Cooperativa Network in Spanish 2300 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Excerpt] The Supreme Court this afternoon decreed the release on bail of retired General Hugo Salas Wenzel, former director of the CNI [National Information Center], who has been found guilty of a crime described in Article 240 of the Penal Code, which punishes public employees who carry out financial operations to benefit relatives.

Gen. Salas is being prosecuted in relation to the 1987 sale of properties in the Grimaldi Village, a former detention center for the CNI and the Dina [National Intelligence Directorate]. The property was sold to the construction company (?SDP), several members of which were Salas' relatives. [passage omitted]

Colombia

* Plans To Strengthen Intelligence Organizations

91SM0250C Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 13 Mar 91 p 3-A

[Article by Miller Rubio Orjuela]

[Text] The brains behind government security agencies are working silently to design a solid reorganization of traditional intelligence systems in an effort to fight terrorism, organized crime, guerrillas, and new types of crime.

When completed, the measures, drafted independently by the Judicial and Investigative Police Directorate (DIJIN), Administrative Department of Security (DAS), and Army, will go to the government for study and evaluation so it may decide how best to proceed.

The new intelligence strategy is, according to programs designed by security agencies, aimed at minimizing the margin of error in operations against organized crime.

To that effect, DIJIN, the main National Police security agency, is proposing the creation of a single intelligence center to channel all information on the movements, plans, activities, background, and criminal profile of members of criminal organizations engaging in terrorist activities, kidnapping, and drug trafficking.

The police measure proposes to set up five intelligence branches under the main agency, located in Cali, Medellin, Barranquilla, Cucuta, and Bogota.

Distribution of branch offices was determined based on a population study, crime rates, and strategic locations of the five capitals, from which surveillance can cover the entire country, EL TIEMPO was told by Colonel Luis Enrique Montenegro Rinco, director of DIJIN.

The police measure also hopes that the government, funded by the war tax, will increase the institution's budget so as to obtain a specially allocation specifically earmarked to pay informants.

This is in keeping with an attempt to gain more precise information from informers and thus avoid the cost of fruitless large-scale operations such as the two major offensives targeting Pablo Escobar Gaviria over the past 18 months.

The project also proposes the formation of a special group of 1,000 men to staff the five branch agencies and provide them with specialized intelligence training.

From among its own men, DIJIN is selecting those with the best background and most investigative experience. Once that selection has been made, the group will begin a program of training in new intelligence techniques: communications surveillance, the processing of statistical information, sociological studies of criminal organizations, and so on.

For its part, DAS has concentrated on reorganizing its intelligence systems in order to fight new types of crime: computer fraud, white-collar crime, and terrorism aimed at the country's economic infrastructure, its director, General Miguel Maza Marquez, explained.

A group of officials from the agency was sent to the United States for training with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), which specializes in fighting such types of crime.

* Shipboard Seizures in Barranquilla, L.A.

91SM0250E Bogota EL ESPECTADOR in Spanish 18 Mar 91 p 10-A

[Text] In Barranquilla yesterday, Port Police units discovered nine packages containing five kg of cocaine hidden in a Cypriot flagship.

The cocaine was found aboard the Mersun Limasol, which had sailed from Venezuela and was headed for a port north of the American city of Miami carrying 72 containers loaded with different types of merchandise.

Crew members are of Filipino and German nationality. Authorities have initiated their investigation and will take a statement from the vessel's captain.

80 Kg in Los Angeles

In the meantime, an AP cable has reported that customs officials in Los Angeles [L.A.] found 80 kg of cocaine on board a boat from Colombia. The drug was hidden in sandbags used in training boxers.

A DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration] spokesman said the vessel, of Greek registry and named the Adrienne, arrived in L.A. from Cartagena, and added that it had been decided to substitute flour for the cocaine in an attempt to discover who was responsible.

Upon the vessel's arrival in Los Angeles, the plan climaxed with the arrest of Hector Julian Ramirez, 20, a Miami resident who had hired an experienced diving team to remove the cocaine from the vessel's hull. The team consisted of Luis Fernando Ochoa, 30; Ivan Ochoa, 38; and Julia Zambrano Martinez, 50, a native of Bogota, Colombia.

Peru

Fujimori Announces Full Agreement on Drug Accord

PY2204035691 Lima RTP Television Network in Spanish 0100 GMT 22 Apr 91

[Excerpts] President Alberto Fujimori announced today that the antidrug agreement with the United States will be signed before 30 April. He added that the document has

already been drawn up and that it will be available to Congress and the media before it is signed.

President Fujimori also denied alleged disagreements with the church. He said relations with the church are excellent. He made these comments while visiting Bishop Ricardo Duran Flores, whom he congratulated on his 25 years of pastoral work. Fujimori donated a truck to the church.

[Begin recording] [passage omitted] [Unidentified reporter] When will the agreement with the United States be signed. Has a date been set?

[Fujimori] It will be signed soon because all points in the agreement are ready.

[Reporter] But the last paragraph of the agreement has not been defined yet. Senator Mariategui said yesterday that the agreement is not ready and that it says nothing about any dollar financing. What is the situation?

[Fujimori] We never talked about money.

[reporter] What is the aid then?

[Fujimori] The details of the agreement will be discussed at another level. We are providing the framework for the agreement; by working within that framework and established goals, the necessary budget can be established.

[Reporter] What about the last paragraph of the agreement?

[Fujimori] What does the last paragraph refer to?

[Reporter] Senator Mariategui, who is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, told the press about that paragraph. He has access to the document while we do not.

[Fujimori] I do not know the last paragraph.

[Reporter] Is the document written in full?

[Fujimori] The two countries are in full agreement. There is no objection from either Peru or the United States. We have the text in Spanish and English. You know that translations are very delicate. Sometimes one version can put more emphasis on one concept and the other version, on another concept.

[Reporter] You said the agreement will be released to the people. When will that be done?

[Fujimori] I hope it will be next week. We are going to make the agreement available to Congress and to the population through the media. [end recording]

Fujimori on Arming Peasants, Reducing Inflation

PY1904152891 Lima RTP Television Network in Spanish 0100 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] President Alberto Fujimori said today that the government is trying very hard to improve workers' salaries as much as the fiscal situation permits. Fujimori also admitted a possible gasoline price increase in the next few months. Fujimori said the government was optimistic about controlling inflation. We expect the inflation rate to drop to 5 percent a month and to 100 percent a year, Fujimori said.

Fujimori said that giving arms to peasant patrols is part of the government strategy to fight subversion, but he cautioned that results will not be seen for some time.

[Begin recording] [Fujimori] We expect our inflation rate to drop to nearly 5 percent in the coming months. We would like to see an annual inflation rate not greater than 100 percent. It is still very high, but we are coming down from a 3,000-percent inflation rate last year. We would consider a 100-percent rate a success. We are obviously concerned about recession but we are going to implement measures to help the productive apparatus without affecting our anti-inflationary policies.

[Reporter] What about the pacification commands? Do you think that other political parties will support you on that? How soon can we expect to see the results?

[Fujimori] We cannot expect immediate results. For the past eight months we have been preparing our antisubversive policies. For the time being, and this is no secret, we are arming the peasant patrols. We have purchased an important quantity of weapons to arm all peasant patrols.

[Reporter] How much was spent on arms, Mr. President?

[Fujimori] I would not like to talk about figures, but all peasant patrols will receive arms.

[Reporter] What about the risks involved in arming peasants?

[Fujimori] The arms are being delivered under Armed Forces supervision. There is strict control on their use.

[Reporter] Will you also arm the urban patrols?

[Fujimori] Not yet.

[Reporter] Congress had a heated debate on the problem of low salaries. How would you solve this problem considering that we are in an economic crisis?

[Fujimori] We cannot solve that problem soon. The low level of salaries depends on scarce fiscal resources. Salaries will go up if the budget improves. We are working very hard to improve the system. Prospects are good. We did not need to implement sharp gasoline increases for instance. We are administering the budget, and inflation is slowing down. Salaries heve not gone up lately, but neither have the prices of essential goods. [end recording]

Army Arms Civilians To Fight Shining Path

PY1804181591 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1841 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Excerpt] Lima, 17 Apr (EFE)—For the first time since political violence began in Peru 11 years ago, the Peruvian Army has begun to arm the "peasant defense patrols" civilian militia which opposes the Shining Path Maoist group.

This takes place just as it is announced that Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori will personally head the struggle against subversion.

In the town of Comas, in the great Mantaro River valley, Junin Department, some 450 members of the civilian militias have received shotguns and ammunition to defend their communities, families, and assets against the Shining Path incursions.

A total of 47 of the 52 communities in the Mantaro River valley have repeatedly requested weapons to fight against the maoist group. They have received shotguns and ammunition to defend their families and assets against the Shining Path incursions during a ceremony presided over by General Luis Perez, chief of the Political-Military Command in that zone.

This zone is under the state of emergency due to the continuous actions of the terrorist group. It is an important area because the Mantaro hydroelectric dam, that generates most of the electricity in Peru, is located in that zone.

About a year ago the Shining Path transferred its focus of terrorist activities from Ayacucho to the department of Junin, where it has bombed the electricity line, causing long blackouts. They take advantage of these blackouts to attack other companies, embassies, banks, and official institutions.

During the weapons delivery ceremony, Gen. Perez told the peasants that they "are the first to receive firearms, following an evaluation of their organization, their discipline, and their identification with the fatherland and democracy."

Julio Paredes Reyes, head of the "peasant defense patrols" in the zone, stated that now they are armed they are ready to defeat the Shining Path terrorists and those of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). [passage omitted]

* Status, Objectives of Terrorist Groups Analyzed

91SM0258A Lima EXPRESO in Spanish 2-4 Mar 91

[Report on round tables sponsored by EXPRESO staff with contributions from countersubversion think tanks; published in installments]

[2 Mar pp 6-7]

[Text] Today EXPRESO begins publishing the papers and debates of a series of round tables on the internal war in Peru and the design of a democratic and effective strategy against subversion. EXPRESO believes that Peru's democratic system cannot delay any longer the decision to confront this war with all existing resources and with a truly intelligent, politically-oriented and directed strategy in which all Peruvians will participate.

For this purpose, EXPRESO has organized four round tables on the following topics: the status of the subversive effort, antisubversive doctrines and strategies, organizing for the internal war and the national defense system, and the legal framework for the internal war.

For each topic we have requested papers, and the papers have been debated. Today we publish the paper by the Legal Defense Institute (IDL) on the advancement of subversion and a commentary by the National Defense Research Institute (Iniden) on the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). Tomorrow we will publish the debate on these papers.

Participating in this debate were Raul Gonzalez of the Center for Development Studies and Promotion (Desco), retired Colonel Jose Bailetti of the Iniden, Rosa Maria Santisteban of the Institute for the Study and Promotion of Peace and Democracy (Demos), and Carlos Tapia of the Center for Populational Promotion and Development (Ceprodep).

The Internal War: Diagnosis of the Current Situation of Political Violence by the Legal Defense Institute

By the end of 1990, 19,215 citizens of Peru had died as a result of political violence; more than 3,000 had disappeared, and the property damage exceeded $18 billion, according to some estimates.

Sendero Luminoso [Shining Path] is still the primary cause of violence in the country, and it was responsible for many of the deaths and the economic damage that continues to push us down into the tragic spiral of violence.

According to statistics compiled by the Senate Special Committee for the 1990, Sendero Luminoso (SL) was responsible for 66 percent of the actions, compared to 11 percent for the MRTA and 23 percent for other groups, including paramilitary organizations, unidentified groups, and minor organizations.

Sendero Luminoso

In 1990, especially in the first half of the year, Sendero Luminoso displayed significant signs of political weakness, perhaps the most important since it launched its "popular war." In the last months of that year and the first months of this year, however, a number of factors indicate that it is at least partially overcoming this situation and may even be taking on new and greater challenges in its strategy.

Political Weakness

Among the elements that explained the situation of political weakness were:

First of all, the failure of its election boycott. Despite the extremely violent actions that it carried out for this purpose, its failure was obvious. It did, however, manage to disrupt the electoral process in some rural areas.

Secondly, the police action that hammered its urban structures with increasing frequency, as evidenced by the raid on the so-called general headquarters of the People's Defense Revolutionary Movement (MRDP) in Monterrico and other major arrests in the interior of the country.

Thirdly, the public signs of internal tension among rival factions, the challenge to Abimael Guzman's leadership,

and even a certain amount of division in the rigid Senderist structure, which tarnished its previous image of internal cohesion.

The final element, and perhaps the most important one, is the problems it has had in establishing itself in rural areas. In the countryside, especially in Ayacucho and Junin, a rising peasant resistance to its presence has become evident. One manifestation of that is the civil defense committees promoted and implemented by the armed forces as part of their military strategy. Both these organizations and the autonomous ones formed by the peasants themselves pose a serious problem to the Senderists in their efforts to establish "popular committees" and "support bases," an essential aspect of their strategy. These organizations also severely hamper the Senderists' military activities.

Similarly, the fact that many of SL's "armed strikes" have failed in various parts of the country can be interpreted as another demonstration of the population's reaction against domination by terror.

Nevertheless, in our opinion, the heaviest political blow suffered by this organization was the election of Alberto Fujimori as president of the republic. This is because the population expressed with its vote a profound dissatisfaction with the current situation and rejected the political class as a whole while ignoring the Senderists' call for a boycott.

The populace opted to channel its discontent in a radically different way, voting for a new political figure for whom their only expectation (and this represented another defeat) was that he would be capable of modernizing the country with technology and capital.

Thus, what emerged was a situation of serious political weakness in Sendero Luminoso. The clearest expression of that weakness came during the so-called shock period, when despite the existence of "objective conditions" for a social explosion and its efforts to provoke such an explosion, it failed catastrophically in its attempt to create social chaos.

Sendero's Recovery

In recent months, this state of affairs has reportedly begun to change for SL. It has begun to regain its political protagonism in an important way.

A number of developments point in this direction. Among them are the assault on the Mobil Oil camp; the political impact of the resumption of selective assassinations, such as those of former Minister Orestes Rodriguez, Popular Christian Party (PPC) leader Javier Puiggros, and Deputy Alejandro Luna Victoria, among others; and the violent escalation of ambushes, bombings, selective assassinations, and other actions carried out throughout the country in January, primarily in its strongholds such as Ayacucho, Junin, the Upper Huallaga, and others.

What is apparently happening inside the Senderist organization is that the necessary steps are being taken to attain what they call "strategic equilibrium."

Not all of the necessary facts are available, but it appears that at various Senderist conclaves held in the latter months of 1990, it was determined that conditions were ripe for entering the transition to "strategic equilibrium."

This is based on the assumption of being ready to enter the "war of movements" and going from Clandestine Popular Committees to the stage of Open Popular Committees in SL's spheres of influence. These new popular committees, according to the Senderist strategy in the countryside and the poor neighborhoods of the cities, would have the triple function of "combating, organizing, and producing."

Thus, according to its documents, SL has implemented its "fourth campaign" to this end. In this manner it intends to make a great leap from the "war of guerrillas" to the "war of movements." For this purpose it needs to mobilize the bulk of its components, in the city as well as the countryside, seeking to consolidate further the "principal military force," that is, the so-called Popular Guerrilla Army, with the participation of the "grassroots forces."

Territorial Control

In this regard, SL continued working on its strategy of "popular war from the countryside to the city." One of the key elements of this effort is its establishment in the coastal provinces of Lima and the adjacent departments, Ancash and Ica, to which it has access through the mountain provinces bordering the emergency zones, such as Huanuco and Pasco in the north, Huancavelica and Ayacucho in the south, and Junin in the central region.

Perhaps the most significant development has been the resurgence of its actions in the provinces north and south of Lima, in an effort to take advantage of the natural corridors through which it can mobilize its columns.

In the case of the mountains of Lima (Cajatambo, above all, and Oyon to a lesser extent), SL initially carried out supply actions in the local mines. The next step was to penetrate some peasant areas where there is little police or official presence, those authorities having fled in the face of threats. In Cajatambo, for example, towards the border with Ancash, in the province of Bolognesi, SL has formed Popular Committees and has replaced many community authorities.

Among the coastal provinces, Huaura and Barranca have been the most seriously affected. Sendero Luminoso has given priority to the Norte Chico area, from Huaura to Barranca, especially in the rural areas near the Northern Pan-American Highway. SL's proselytizing activities are focused on the axis of Rontoy, Alcaray, and El Sol, formerly agrarian cooperatives, between Huaura and Barranca. In the north, its efforts have centered on the pampa area of Medio Mundo up to Barranca.

In other regions, SL is continuing its actions in the central part of the country, emphasizing its effort to establish a rearguard zone in the Ene Valley, in the department of Junin. At the same time, it is keeping the Upper Huallaga as an area for the development of its military columns and

the formation of new cadres, and as a source of economic resources, based on its involvement in the marketing of coca and its derivatives.

In the latter area, SL has managed to establish itself fairly solidly, given that the evidence shows its control over the drug marketing circuit has expanded. As a result, it was able to resist the strong military offensives of 1989 and 1990.

In the same manner, it is continuing its actions in important areas such as Ayacucho, where it is trying to restore its dominance, and Puno, critical because of its ties along the Bolivian border. SL is opening up new fronts in the departments of Arequipa and Piura, where it is gradually and steadily establishing itself in natural corridors that link the coast to the mountains, in the first case, and apparently, the border area to Ecuador in the second case.

The other objective of its "fourth campaign" is to increase the cohesion of the "generated organizations," integrating "the masses" as much as possible into its actions. This means bringing organizations such as the Neighborhood Resistance Movement, the Movement of Classist Workers, the Neighborhood Classist Movement, the Street Vendor Movement, and the Classist Intellectual Movement, among others, under the umbrella of the MRDP.

The capital is becoming a key area in its work toward this objective. Senderist activity is most significant in the poor neighborhoods, through the so-called Neighborhood Classist Movement. Following the slogan, "Combat, Organize, and Produce," which encompasses its conception of political and military development, SL is attempting to build, on the one hand, the "militia forces" that will become "grassroots forces" or "local forces," depending on their situation, and that at a given moment will be complemented with the "principal force."

On the other hand, it is trying to organize the Open Popular Committees, which are presumed to exist in the four zones into which SL has divided Lima. They are the bases of the Neighborhood Resistance Movement.

Recovery Factors

A number of elements appear to have converged to make this recovery possible for SL. We mention here those which, in our opinion, are the most important.

In the first place, the internal crisis in SL and the police crackdowns were apparently not as severe as was originally thought. The sectors that were affected, though important, are not in the nucleus of the Senderist organization.

Secondly, although it is true that SL proved incapable of seizing the opportunity presented by the impact of the economic measures on the population, these measures have a posteriori created a climate that is propitious for SL's development.

In the third place, there is the legitimacy crisis of the political forces in general, and in particular the debacle of the left. The division of the left has seriously impaired its ability to represent and speak for the popular sectors, leaving a major political vacuum that the Senderists would like to fill.

Fourthly, there is the repetition of the extremely serious errors in the government's strategy of confronting the violence since Fujimori took office.

In this process, at one of the high points of the crackdown begun in late 1990, the police raided several houses, among them the residences of people presumed to belong to SL. They also raided an alleged "headquarters" and apparently made major arrests.

We do not have sufficient information to determine for certain how high in the SL hierarchy the arrests went. All indications are that what was hit was the structure of one of the generated organizations, which would be similar in importance to the raid on the Monterrico house.

Aside from that, however, SL has undoubtedly suffered a political blow, especially in that it proved vulnerable to police action. The image of an impenetrable organization with rigid compartmentalization and secrecy in its management, and whose leader is practically beyond the law's grasp, was seriously tarnished.

The MRTA

The MRTA is still a bit player in the country's political violence, although it has carried out some spectacular actions that have had a great impact on the public. As a result, it has scored some political points.

Although the MRTA has a presence in some parts of the country, unlike Sendero Luminoso it does not have a clearly defined political program. It is difficult to find a comprehensive strategic line that informs its actions; it would appear that the MRTA's permanent objective is to dominate the headlines with actions more spectacular than SL's. Its political activity seems to be oriented toward a violent response to the injustice and the crisis that currently plague the country, but it does not represent a coherent political program.

It has evidently been unable to overcome this problem even though in 1990 it managed to restore its national leadership. When Peter Cardenas Schulte, Hugo Avellaneda and Julio Rincon were released in 1989 for lack of evidence, and when Victor Polay and Alberto Gonzales Olaechea escaped in July 1990, it regained its most experienced cadres, those with the best political-ideological training.

An analysis of the actions of its Northeastern, Eastern, and Central "Fronts" reveals unequal and sporadic development of its political-military objectives in the rural area. As the MRTA recognizes in its documents, the Central Front had been the strategic one, and the primary objective of the Northeastern Front had been to train combatants to open up and strengthen the Central Front.

The events of 1989 thwarted this attempt, as most of the cadres were lost in the clash at Los Molinos, Jauja. The MRTA has tried to restore its presence in that area by carrying out propaganda and proselytism in the provinces

of Tarma, Jauja, Concepcion, and Huancayo, primarily. In the latter city, it is constantly clashing with SL.

Thus, the Northeastern Front, active since 1988, has become the central axis for the development of its rural military line. The most important military force of the MRTA, comprising five columns, is reportedly operating on this front. In addition to what can be considered its "army," it also has an "urban, suburban, and rural militia force."

Given that this area is increasingly dependent on the illegal cultivation of coca, the relationship between the MRTA and the drug traffic is unclear. Although in the beginning, during the incursions of 1988, it declared that it would confront the drug traffickers, the chief of the Northeastern Front, "Commander Ricardo," said in an interview in the magazine SI in October, "Every flight should be subject to a tax."

SL's attack on the Mobil camp revealed that this group's pressure on the MRTA's "territories" is increasingly strong, and it would not be surprising if this area became another battleground between the two organizations.

The MRTA is also present on the Amazon plain in the domain of the Ucayali River (which it calls its Eastern Front), in the area between Atalaya and Contamana, and especially near Pucallpa up to Aguaytia. In the latter region, however, SL has also made significant advances recently.

In the Norte Chico of Lima, the areas of Huacho, Barranca, and Huaura, both urban and rural, are important to the MRTA. Its presence is manifested in armed propaganda actions and proselytism.

In Lima itself, it is trying to infiltrate the leadership of the poor shantytowns capitalizing on the economic crisis and the attrition of the left by launching food distribution operations. But the essence of its actions in the capital city is the increasingly frequent use of bombings and selective assassination, which are becoming one of its principal lines of action.

In the Military Line document prepared for its Third Plenum, the MRTA states that selective assassinations are "concrete and precise actions," unlike those of SL, which "has made indiscriminate use of them." However, the course of events is leading the MRTA to adopt an approach similar to SL's.

The MRTA is also continuing "to work" on collecting "war contributions" to finance its "war" and on kidnappings for the same purpose.

After the kidnapping of Deputy Lopez, there was talk of dialogue; at the same time, however, the MRTA rejected the possibility of President Fujimori serving as an interlocutor.

The same ambiguity could also be seen in its position on the electoral process. In the two election campaigns that took place in the country, it took contradictory stances. In the first round it favored either voting for "popular candidates" or casting void ballots; in the run-off elections, its position was "void or blank ballots." The population did not pay the slightest heed to either of these directives.

In short, despite its spectacular actions in some political situations, the MRTA does not have a clear strategic and political program to provide a framework and a context for its actions. The weakness and ambiguity of its platform, which it has presented as an alternative to Senderism, has forced it to escalate its violence ever more persistently in order to affirm its presence on the political scene.

The recent bloody attacks on interests linked to the United States in Peru, which the MRTA has carried out for the political objective of demonstrating its "anti-imperialism" and its "internationalist solidarity" in relation to the war in the Persian Gulf, should be viewed from this perspective.

State Response

When the new administration took office, conditions were favorable for taking a radically different approach to the strategy for combating violence.

Despite these favorable conditions, however, the government opted for a passive attitude, essentially continuing the policies that had been applied thus far. It reiterated the by then old political practice of allowing the armed forces and the police to take charge of the problem. In this way, the errors of the past were repeated: the lack of an overall political orientation for the government's action; the limitation of the response to the military sphere and the absence of political decisiveness to guarantee that the civilian sector would control the pacification strategies; and the pigeonholing of the population into the categories of potential accomplices to subversion, informers, or "cannon fodder."

The systematic restriction of constitutional rights in the emergency zones, far from weakening subversion, has fueled the violence and undermined democratic institutions. The persistent recurrence of human rights violations accompanying the strategies is another of these errors.

[Box, p 7]

MRTA Could Become Legal

According to the Iniden, the MRTA's medium-term goal is to "form a single front like a Revolutionary Front of the Masses that would present a viable power alternative and a solid vanguard in the struggle for the socialist revolution."

The Iniden says that some of the motives for the MRTA to seek legality might be:

1. The ideological breakdown of the Marxist-Leninist groups in the world.
2. The precarious political and economic situation of Cuba and of Fidel Castro.
3. The decision of M-19 [19 April Movement] to abandon clandestine activity and its subsequent success in legal participation in Colombian politics.

4. The electoral debacle of the legal left and its virtual disintegration.
5. The MRTA's poor showing militarily against SL and the military and police forces, while in the legitimate sphere it has an appreciable number of admirers who are not very enthusiastic about the armed struggle.
6. The possibility of taking the lead in the recomposition of United Left, in a joint effort with political sectors of the left and eventually the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), as well as important public and private-sector trade unions.

In short, despite its spectacular actions in some political situations, the MRTA does not have a clear strategic and political program to give meaning to its actions. The ambiguity of its platform, which it has presented as an alternative to Senderism, has forced it to escalate its violence ever more persistently in order to affirm its presence on the political scene.

[Graph on page 6: Shows the total number of deaths and disappearances for each year from 1980 to 1990, with a total of 19,215 deaths and 4,736 disappearances for the period. Graph not reproduced.].

[Map on page 7: Shows high-conflict areas and regions of terrorist expansion. Map not reproduced.]

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[Text] In an effort to contribute to the pacification of the country, EXPRESO organized a series of round tables to deal with the issue of political violence, for the purpose of arriving at an approximation of what should be a democratic antisubversive strategy. The first discussion focused on the current status of the subversive movements. Participating were Dr. Rosa Maria Santisteban, representing the Institute for the Study and Promotion of Peace and Democracy (Demos); Carlos Tapia, adviser to the Center for Populational Promotion and Development (Ceprodep); retired Army Colonel Jose Bailetti of the National Defense Research Institute (Iniden); and sociologist Raul Gonzalez, a member of the Center for Development Studies and Promotion (Desco). Here are the highlights of the first meeting, held at the offices of this newspaper.

[EXPRESO] What indicators make it possible to measure or evaluate the situation of violence in Peru?

[Bailetti] The Iniden takes into account six indicators in evaluating the situation of violence in the country. They are:

1. Deaths per day.
2. Deaths per action.
3. Recruitment-attrition. This refers to the recruitment ability of the subversive groups and the state's gains or losses in terms of the loyalty of the population.
4. Provocation-response. This is based on the attempts by the armed groups to provoke reactions by the state that they can then take advantage of for their own purposes. SL makes the greatest use of this expedient.
5. Consensus-coercion. This has to do with the exercise of power. It turns out that both the state and the subversive groups use power coercively and in an authoritarian manner.
6. Territorial control. This indicator allows us to evaluate the presence of the state and the subversive movements in national territory.

[EXPRESO] Colonel, according to these indicators you have mentioned, are the subversive movements advancing?

[Bailetti] The subversive movements are advancing. To cite an example, just last year SL was active in 20 departments. Afterwards it pulled back. But at present, we see that its actions have begun to have a strong impact. In December of last year in Ayacucho, San Martin, and Huancayo, SL actions involving between 20 and 200 militants were carried out. These actions display a characteristic that is typical of guerrillas. That is disturbing. We can say that SL is getting into the coca business and is trafficking. SL is not longer just the "protector" or the one collecting the contributions. Now it has gone into production. Gordon MacCormick ("The Shining Path and the Future of Peru," Rand National Defense Research Institute, USA, 1990) estimated that SL obtained nearly $30 million a year from drug trafficking. At this rate, Sendero may ultimately take in $100 million to $150 million a year from drug trafficking.

MRTA Growing

[EXPRESO] That is in regard to the advancement of SL. Is the MRTA growing also, in your opinion?

[Bailetti] The MRTA is also growing. However, the MRTA's growth is not significant militarily, but rather in terms of the support it is gaining in other segments of the population. I am referring to some legal sectors of the left that see the possibility that this movement may go legitimate the way M-19 did in Colombia.

[EXPRESO] To what sectors are you referring, specifically?

[Bailetti] To the Popular Democratic Union (UDP), the ANP [expansion not given], the BPR [expansion not given], etc.

Other Indicators

[EXPRESO] What other indicators should be taken into consideration to evaluate this state of affairs?

[Santisteban] There are two types of actions that should be evaluated: on the one hand, violent actions, and on the other hand, nonviolent actions, that is, those of a political nature. My impression is that the pace of violent subversive actions and political actions has been stepped up. The problem with the evaluation of the political actions of the subversive movements is that they are not quantifiable.

[EXPRESO] Has poverty been a determining factor in the success achieved by SL in the areas under its control?

[Santisteban] More than poverty, the lack of legitimacy of the state has made it easier for Sendero to control some areas.

Two Wars

[Tapia] In my opinion, any evaluation of the war should take into account the achievement of goals, the movement forward and backward in relation to those goals. And what I see is that there are two wars under way that have different political objectives. One is that being waged by SL, and the other, that of the armed forces. Both have points in common, but their objectives are different.

In this regard, a first attempt to approximate an assessment of the advancement of subversion should be based on the objectives set forth by the subversive groups.

In the case of SL, what we must evaluate is the achievements it has made with respect to its objectives. Evaluate whether it is meeting its deadlines. What we must analyze is not so much Sendero's actions, but what it is not accomplishing in terms of its strategy and its schedule. The number of actions should serve as a reference, but not to evaluate the real advancement of SL. What we must look at is the quality of its new actions.

[EXPRESO] According to the objectives set forth by Sendero Luminoso, what would be your evaluation?

[Tapia] SL's advancement is related to its political objectives. In this case, the conquest of the Ene region has been an unexpected advancement for the Senderists. On the main front (Huancavelica, Ayacucho, Abancay, Andahuaylas) it has a solid foothold. One of the elements in evaluating SL according to its political objectives is the creation of popular committees.

Another necessary element in the analysis is whether they still have the ability to take the initiative. And SL still has the initiative.

[EXPRESO] What is the location of these popular committees that you mentioned?

[Tapia] In the Huallaga, in the Ene, in some areas of the province of La Mar. They are having a lot of problems in Lima. In the eastern cone of metropolitan Lima they are trying to move toward that objective. Right now they still have a long way to go to reach the next phase: strategic equilibrium.

In my opinion, SL has not managed—according to its political objectives—to accumulate enough power to move on to the phase of strategic equilibrium, which is essential for the legitimacy of the military command's leadership.

Time Frame

[EXPRESO] Within the time frame established by SL, which political objectives has it achieved and which ones has it not achieved?

[Tapia] Like any fundamentalist movement, SL is writing its own history, and therefore it makes its deadlines agree with the objectives it has set forth. But in general terms, they said that by this time they would be making the transition from the war of guerrillas to the war of movements, which entails the formation of a front—an unstable one, to be sure, but still a front. For this purpose they need to establish a battalion structure in the Popular Guerrilla Army (EGP) and to form a truly operational staff. They have not managed to do this. On this point, SL suffers from a great contradiction. The contradiction lies in the fact that they should have broken out of their political isolation, and they have not done so.

[EXPRESO] Excuse me, but what does breaking out of their "political isolation" mean?

[Tapia] Any Maoist process seeks to break out of its political isolation from society, taking root in society but maintaining its hegemony. But SL, in maintaining its hegemony, has been unable to expand. That is the contradiction of Sendero Luminoso.

[EXPRESO] To expand in those terms, it would have to change its ideas about war. It would have to abandon the Maoist strategy....

[Tapia] Right.

[Gonzalez] It would mean abandoning Gonzalo's Thought.

SL and MRTA

[Tapia] If the Senderists abandon Gonzalo's Thought and open up to a broader policy, then we will really be worried. "Happily," Gonzalo is still in charge of SL.

[Gonzalez] It is important to point out that Gonzalo's Thought is nonviable.

[Tapia] Naturally. "Happily," the MRTA is also there. The MRTA is politically assimilable. It is totally different from SL. As Col. Bailetti said, what the MRTA wants is to become legitimate. The MRTA is not fighting to defeat the armed forces. What it is doing is trying to justify its actions on the basis of the injustice that exists, by means of violent acts that enable it to gain political ground. In this regard, I think it is a serious error not to propose a dialogue with the MRTA.

Sendero Luminoso is another matter. Sendero is an advocate of total war; the MRTA is not. It is incredible that an invalid program like SL's has been able to grow and remain alive.

I believe that the rate at which Sendero is growing, in terms of its own program, is under containment. It will not manage to move on to the next stage.

[EXPRESO] You say that in relation to its objectives, SL is not advancing. But in relation to its actions it is advancing. In territorial terms it is also advancing. So SL's problem is one of time....

[Tapia] No. It is a qualitative problem. I think that SL is advancing, but SL has to build quality in other areas. The first thing it has to do is achieve a staff structure, which it does not have, to go on to the war of maneuvers.

[EXPRESO] What do the stages of war of guerrillas, war of movements, and war of maneuvers mean?

[Tapia] The war of guerrillas involves scattered groups that are recruited among the population.

The war of movements involves contingents that are cohesive enough to be able to engage major military detachments, for example.

I do not think that SL has columns of 200 men at present. What it does is mobilize local forces by coercion. A battalion requires a staff structure which SL does not have.

[EXPRESO] Col. Bailetti, you mentioned that in December 1990 SL carried out several actions in which detachments of 200 men participated. Were these combatants, or were they mobilized under coercion, as Carlos Tapia says?

[Bailetti] We agree with each other. What I am saying is that SL is already moving into the war of guerrillas. We cannot yet say that SL is in a position to move on to the war of movements or to the second stage of the strategic equilibrium.

[Gonzalez] I think that after 11 years we can make a very clear distinction between political violence, which has taken on alarming proportions, and the advancement of armed groups. In this regard, I agree that an armed group is evaluated in terms of how far it has advanced or regressed in accordance with the strategic objectives it set for itself when it began its insurrection.

In its 32-page document, "Elections, No! Popular War, Yes!" SL devotes 16 pages to justifying the course and the strategy it has chosen. And it spends the other 16 pages establishing the grounds for four points.

First, that it is building the Republic of New Democracy. Second, that it is not true that the Popular Guerrilla Army is having trouble expanding. Third, that it is not true that SL has lost the political initiative. Fourth, that the widely proclaimed strategic failure is false.

In this document we have the elements and the variables to evaluate SL's growth or shrinkage.

SL's Problem

[EXPRESO] What is SL's main problem, in your opinion?

[Gonzalez] I think SL's main problem is the fact that it has been unable to establish the Republic of New Democracy that it wanted to build in the countryside.

Sendero has ended up in a confrontation with a large percentage of the peasantry. And this was not contemplated in SL's original program, in which it wanted to represent the peasantry and make that sector the base for launching its enterprise.

Another important element to consider is what is revealed in the statistics. Sendero is a Maoist group that intends to take power through the strategy of going from the countryside to the city. This means that it is in the countryside where the essence of the Republic of New Democracy is created and where the Popular Guerrilla Army is created. Nevertheless, according to the Senate Pacification Committee, SL carried out nearly 1,000 actions in urban areas in 1990, compared to 400 in rural areas. Actions, not deaths. This reveals an emphasis on urban actions rather than rural ones. This is another of SL's problems.

[EXPRESO] What implications can be drawn from the fact that urban actions are on the rise?

[Gonzalez] I get the impression that the trend toward urban actions has distorted the perception of SL. In 1990, terrorist actions fell to the lowest number since 1984, and yet the number of deaths is the highest since 1984. This means that SL has a greater political presence based on murder.

[EXPRESO] In other words, the easy way.

[Gonzalez] That is right. Murder and terrorist actions are the easy way.

No one should infer from all of this that we are adopting a triumphant attitude or that we want to minimize the problem. On the contrary, I think that the main problem Peruvian society must face is that of violence.

What I want to say in closing is that we still have time to defeat the subversives. The trap that Sendero Luminoso finds itself in gives us the time to defeat it.

Strategic Failure

[EXPRESO] To sum up, you say that Sendero's emphasis on urban actions is a sign of its weakness?

[Gonzalez] Totally.

[EXPRESO] Do you consider it a strategic failure?

[Gonzalez] Yes. It is a strategic failure. Sendero is a movement that was supposed to grow in the countryside. It was supposed to build its Republic of New Democracy in the countryside thanks to its bases of support and the popular committees, and to recruit cadres for its Popular Guerrilla Army in the countryside.

Sendero has been unable to attain the goals it set for itself in the countryside. In view of its failure to meet its objectives there, it has moved to the cities to try to hide its weakness in the countryside.

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[Text] According to sociologist Raul Gonzalez of Desco, armed groups are evaluated on the basis of the strategic objectives they set for themselves at the beginning of their insurrection. In this regard, Raul Gonzalez maintains that the subversive group Sendero Luminoso has failed in its strategy of conquering the countryside. Other participants in this analysis of the situation of the seditious movements were Dr. Rosa Maria Santisteban (Demos), Col. Jose Bailetti (Iniden), and Carlos Tapia (Ceprodep).

[EXPRESO] In a war, one cannot face the enemy without knowing him. Raul Gonzalez has maintained that SL has proven to be weak in the countryside. What is your opinion?

[Santisteban] I believe it is totally correct to evaluate SL according to its strategy. One cannot combat the enemy

without knowing him. Nevertheless, in this war the other actor, the state, cannot be ignored. Moreover, we cannot overlook the analysis of the political parties. SL cannot be evaluated without a parallel evaluation of the Peruvian state and the political parties.

[Gonzalez] For a long time the main problem of the political forces in Peru has been the fact that they have done nothing about the problem of subversion. No one has evaluated the problem of SL in its exact dimension. That has been the main reason why today we have no counterinsurgency strategy and we do not know what to do.

So we will only know what to do insofar as we evaluate SL and discover that we can reverse the situation.

[EXPRESO] Do you think SL can attain strategic equilibrium?

[Gonzalez] Strategic equilibrium will come on the day when Sendero not only witnesses the debacle of the state and of the political forces, but also attains sufficient military capacity and firepower to confront the armed forces. In any war, two armies face each other. And in the balance we have a Senderist movement that is growing and a military that is waiting. In an evaluation of the current situation, I believe we must conclude that there is still time to reverse the process.

Strategic Design

[Bailetti] The indicators are tools that enable us to evaluate a strategic design and strategic management. In this regard, we must examine SL's strategic design. Sendero wants power. And power is centralized in Lima. Therefore, for SL to control power, it must control Lima. The political-military strategic objective takes its shape in Lima. To conquer Lima, SL knows full well that first it must conquer the Andes, especially the central Andes. That is the great effort that SL has been focusing on. Suddenly SL came up against the Upper Huallaga, which was in the MRTA's control. SL expelled the MRTA. The Upper Huallaga is very important to SL as a source of financing.

Now, SL's central axis is the Andes. Once Sendero controls the Andes, it can move toward the coast, and then surround Lima.

The Ene

[EXPRESO] What important objectives are part of SL's strategic design in its war against the Peruvian state?

[Bailetti] There are two important elements in SL's strategic design. The Mantaro Valley and the Ene. The Ene is a very important area from the strategic standpoint. In the future, when gas is piped to the coast, it has to go through the Ene. The Mobil incident is an example of what can happen.

In prolonged wars there has always been a "redoubt," a major base. Sendero thought in the beginning that its major base would be Ayacucho. The central mountain range did not fall into place. But the Ene does offer all the advantages of the Upper Huallaga, in addition to being an inaccessible area. The Ene has fairly rough terrain, with trees 20 to 40 meters high. If SL manages to control the left bank of the Ene toward Tarma and Chanchamayo, it would take many years to flush it out.

SL's Achievements

[EXPRESO] Colonel, what representative achievements do you attribute to SL?

[Bailetti] Sendero has achieved things, but it has also made mistakes that the state has never taken advantage of.

[EXPRESO] With regard to its achievements....

[Bailetti] Sendero has a major presence in the eastern range of the Andes around the Upper Huallaga, the Ene, Apurimac, down to Cusco and Puno.

On the other hand, Sendero has been very successful at intimidating the Peruvian people. Look at us. Have we not changed our customs? The blackouts of recent years, have they not changed our lifestyle? In this case, again, the state has done nothing. It never launched a psychological campaign.

Sendero intimidates and provokes, but the accent is on intimidation. Maybe this is because the state does not react, so it has no reason to provoke. In this regard, now the only thing SL is aiming for is the collapse of the state, not a military battle. If this is true, there may be a change in strategy by SL.

[Gonzalez] Excuse me, but in the three stages of Maoist war, one is the collapse, and when the collapse occurs, SL must move on to the strategic equilibrium. That is the final confrontation. At present, according to SL, we are in the stage of trying to bring about the collapse. Therefore, there has been no change in strategy. They are simply applying the Maoist doctrine of war.

SL's Errors

[EXPRESO] What errors has SL made?

[Bailetti] SL's error has been its behavior in the mountain region. The Senderos have culturally assaulted the communities.

Another error of SL has been to try to deny these people a market and to lead them to a subsistence economy.

What we must acknowledge is that in the central mountain range, Sendero is holding its own, but it is doing so primarily through terror.

The State

[EXPRESO] How has the state responded to all of this?

[Tapia] Before the Senderist movement the state was the little schoolhouse, the Civil Guard post, and the health clinic. This began falling apart many years ago. What SL has done is to take over the power structure that had been disintegrating in the central-south mountain range. In other words, the power of the caciques who had served as intermediaries in the control of civilian society. When the power of the cacique disappeared, the Senderists came in

and occupied a very similar power structure: authoritarian, but with paternalistic tendencies.

So that state was the manifestation of an extremely weak power structure, without the need for Sendero's presence. It is not that SL has destroyed the state in a gigantic effort at consciousness-raising. That was the state that the mercantilist bourgeoisie had coopted, a state that showed its limitations.

On the other hand, the military and police forces, in their struggle against SL, are fulfilling expectations. And they are not doing a bad job. They are not the ones who have made mistakes. When we criticize the state, why do we not criticize other sectors of civilian society? To cite an example, what about the businessmen who pay contributions to the subversives? To be more specific, what mine owner does not pay contributions to the subversives?

[Gonzalez] All mine owners must be paying contributions to the subversives.

[EXPRESO] But that is because they have no choice....

[Tapia] But that tells us what a crisis the system is in. That is why the Senderists, despite their irrational program, have been able to advance and develop. Even before SL came along, the state was already falling apart. In conclusion, the diagnosis is that the state is doing what it can under the present circumstances. I do not know what the state can do in its position, unless we begin to comprehend that the Senderist political program in the areas where it has established itself makes it impossible to reproduce the same state. What we must build is a different state. If government officials are unable to establish a strong link between the pacification program and the economic stabilization program, then we will fail to have a clear vision of what kind of war we face.

[EXPRESO] Thus we return to the idea of two wars that you were discussing....

[Tapia] That is right. That is why I was saying that there are two wars: on the one hand, a war waged by a political group that has military methods to develop its objectives, and on the other hand, a war waged by the military, which is trying to defend its troops and its resources.

A single battlefield was not defined. This political program should have been countered with another political program that involved the necessary changes in the place where the state had collapsed. And the armed forces should have been given a role to play in that political program.

Because of the failure to view the problem in this way, the struggle has taken the course it has, and we are well aware of the results.

Toward a Strategy

[Santisteban] I totally agree. The idea is to put together that political program, which must be implemented by the state, because the civilian society cannot carry out such a program on its own.

[Gonzalez] Any outline of a counterinsurgency strategy has to be viable in the medium and long terms, but also in the short term. Otherwise it will fail.

In this regard, I would like to point out that problems that must be faced.

On the one hand, we have the retreat of the state. On the other hand, we have the repression that undermined the relationship between the military and police forces and the populace. These are two problems that must be solved.

In the third place, the institutions and political forces have been discredited by their failure to deal with the circumstances.

Another element is the frustration of certain military sectors, who feel that they are doing the best they can and are demanding that the government and society devise a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. Meanwhile, no political group is proposing any strategy that is viable for the short term, or that can be applied tomorrow. All of the political groups in the country agree that the struggle against subversion must strengthen democracy; that human rights must be respected; that solutions must be found to the injustice, poverty, and frustration, and that the armed groups capitalize on these problems; that the struggle must be led by civilians and it must be political in nature; and that a comprehensive strategy is required. On these points all political groups agree. But the fact remains that no political force has emerged to propose a political program of this nature.

The war has not been politicized, as Carlos Tapia suggests.

[EXPRESO] What does it mean to politicize the war?

[Gonzalez] To make everyone feel that they are part of the war, and political-civilian leadership is needed.

[EXPRESO] And what would be required, then, to outline what would ultimately be a democratic antisubversion strategy?

[Gonzalez] Two things: first, political will, and second, economic resources.

Economic resources are scarce. And they will remain scarce tomorrow and the day after. Therefore, all we possess to confront this problem with is political will.

Uruguay

USSR Granted $35-Million Loan for Food Imports

PY1804183091 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2338 GMT 17 Apr 91

[Text] Montevideo, 17 Apr (EFE)—The Uruguayan Central Bank has reported that it has granted a $35-million loan to the Soviet Union for food purchases over the next 12 months. The USSR will have to use that loan to finance imports of food from Uruguay.

According to a Central Bank report, the loan was granted by the Uruguayan Central Bank for a period of two years, with an interest rate equivalent to the international Libor

[London Interbank Offered Rate]. The USSR has been negotiating with the official Uruguayan banks to finance imports from this country for a year.

At the end of 1990 Uruguay suspended shipments of wool to the Soviet Union due to lack of payment. The payments were normalized after the Bank of the Republic provided financing. The $35-million loan will be signed tomorrow in Montevideo by representatives of the Uruguayan official banks and Soviet diplomats.

Minister Calls Ties With Cuba 'Exemplary'

FL1904133591 Havana Tele Rebelde Network in Spanish 1100 GMT 19 Apr 91

[Text] Uruguayan Foreign Minister Hector Gros Espiell has described relations with Cuba as exemplary and expressed his desire that they should serve to affirm Latin American solidarity. In an exclusive interview with PRENSA LATINA on the occasion of the holding in Montevideo of a week of homage to Jose Marti to mark the 100th anniversary of his "Our America" essay, the Uruguayan foreign minister made a brief evaluation of the ties between his country and Cuba.

Gros Espiell said that diplomatic relations between Uruguay and Cuba are undoubtedly very good, based on mutual respect and nonintervention in internal affairs, without harming each government's and people's principles and ideals. The Uruguayan foreign minister stressed that he hopes these relations will serve to affirm Latin American solidarity and a future for Latin America as united, in solidarity, and democratic.

Army 'Concerned' About Advance of Leftists

PY1904174491 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2222 GMT 16 Apr 91

[Text] Montevideo, 16 Apr (EFE) — It was reported today that retired General Ivan Paulos, president of the Uruguayan Military Circle, has stressed that the Uruguayan Army "is concerned" about the decline in the number of military personnel and about the possibility that the leftist coalition Broad Front might assume the national government.

Paulo, chief of the intelligence services during the military regime that governed Uruguay between 1973 and 1975 and considered to belong to the "hardline" sector of the Armed Forces, made this assertion on 15 April during an address honoring the military men that fell in the fight against subversion during the de facto regime.

According to Paulos, the Broad Front's desire for "rapprochement and political dialogue" of the Broad Front with the military, in view of the possibility that the front may assume responsibility for the national government, "responds to the urgent political need compelling them and not to a basic change and good intentions."

Several military men that governed Uruguay during the de facto regime as well as current Army commander Lieutenant General Guillermo de Nava, who stressed "his support" for Paulos' remarks, participated in the ceremony at the Military Circle.

The Broad Front was founded in 1971, and in the 1989 elections it obtained the departmental government (municipality) of Montevideo, where half of Uruguay's population resides. Thus, for the first time in the history of this country a socialist, Tabare Vazquez, took over as mayor.

Paulos stressed that the Armed Forces are concerned about "the public debate that the Communist Party carried out with impunity during its last congress. The debate centered on the suitability of again creating an armed apparatus."

Paulos also expressed his concern about the "continued political and biased exploitation of past events that derived from the state of internal war."

"It is known that war emerges through actions of violence and force that have the intention of subjecting our will to the enemy. This is not obtained without suffering and the loss of life, especially when it is a question of subversive warfare," the military man stressed.

Numerous human rights violations were committed during the military regime, but the trials against those who were possibly involved were nullified by the so-called Expiration Law approved by Congress in 1986 and then ratified by the population during a plebiscite in 1989.